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THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY: FROM PRIVACY NOTICES TO 
EFFECTIVE TRANSPARENCY1 
Paula J. Bruening* 
Mary J. Culnan** 
Openness is the first fundamental principle of fair information 
practices with “notice” serving to practically implement openness 
in most commercial transactions. However, current notices have 
been widely criticized as being too complex, legalistic, lengthy, and 
opaque. This Article argues that to achieve the openness required 
by the first fair information practice principle, data protection and 
privacy should move from a “notice” model to an environment of 
“transparency.” It asserts that the terms “notice” and 
“transparency” are not synonymous and that different definitions 
apply to each. 
The Article begins by reviewing the history of notice in the 
United States and its traditional roles in privacy and data 
protection. It considers the challenges and limitations of notice, and 
the attempts to address them and the lessons learned from these 
efforts. The Article also examines the implications of emerging 
technologies and data uses such as mobile apps, big data analytics 
and the Internet of Things for traditional notice. This Article 
proposes that what is needed is a move from notice to an 
environment of transparency that includes improved notices, 
attention to contextual norms, integrating the design of notices into 
system development as part of privacy-by-design, public education, 
and new technological solutions. Finally, it presents arguments for 
business buy-in and regulatory guidance. While the historical 
                                                
 1 The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors. An earlier version 
of this paper was presented at the 8th Annual Privacy Law Scholars Conference, 
Berkeley, California, June 2015. We acknowledge the helpful comments of Lorrie 
Cranor, Robert Gellman, David Hoffman, Anne Klinefelter, Mary Madden, Dawn 
Schrader and the PLSC attendees on the earlier version. 
 *  Intel Corporation 
 ** Bentley University and Future of Privacy Forum 
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review is limited to the experience in the U.S., the proposals for 
creating an environment of transparency can apply across 
jurisdictions. Further, while transparency is necessary but not 
sufficient for assuring fair data use, a discussion of issues related to 
the full complement of the fair information principles is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The first principle of fair information practices states that 
“[t]here shall be no personal-data record-keeping system whose very 
existence is secret and there shall be a policy of openness about an 
organization’s personal-data record-keeping policies, practices, and 
systems.” 2  This principle requires that organizations make their 
information practices visible to the public. Effective implementation 
of this principle is essential to promoting fairness. A lack of 
openness potentially enables organizations to collect and use 
information without protections and outside the scrutiny of 
regulators, consumers, or privacy advocates. 
Since the late 1970s, what has commonly been referred to as 
“notice” has served to practically establish openness in most 
commercial transactions.3 Notice has been relied upon to inform 
individuals’ decisions about the collection, processing, sharing, and 
reuse of their personal information. In the United States, notice has 
also served as the basis for regulation by the Federal Trade 
Commission under Section 5 of the FTC Act,4 which provides that 
companies whose practices are at odds with what is stated in their 
notices may be prosecuted for deception. 5  The European Data 
Protection Directive specifies the information about data collection, 
processing, and sharing that must be provided to individuals.6 The 
                                                
 2 In a 1973 report, a U.S. government advisory committee initially proposed 
and named Fair Information Practices as a set of principles for protecting the 
privacy of personal data in record-keeping systems. The Secretary’s Advisory 
Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems issued the report. Records, 
Computers and the Rights of Citizens: Report of the Secretary’s Advisory 
Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
EDUCATION AND WELFARE, http://epic.org/privacy/hew1973report/default.html 
[hereinafter Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens]. See p. 41 for a list 
of the original Fair Information Practices. 
 3  Personal Privacy in an Information Society: The Report of the Privacy 
Protection Study Commission, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER 
(1977), https://epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report/. 
 4 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
 5  Id. See generally CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: 
PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY (Cambridge University Press 2016) (discussing 
privacy policy and the FTC). 
 6 Council Directive 95/46, 1995 (EU). 
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Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Framework7  states that data 
controllers should provide clear and easily accessible statements that 
articulate their practices and policies with respect to personal 
information.8 
Notice arguably fosters openness by requiring companies to 
make public the business models, vendor relationships, and data 
practices that drive the digital economy. However, since the mid-
1990s, both online and offline notices have been criticized by 
regulators, privacy advocates, and businesses as being too complex, 
legalistic, lengthy, and opaque. Questions about how notices could 
be improved figure prominently in nearly every discussion about 
privacy. Businesses complain of the challenge of writing notices that 
meet regulators’ requirements for completeness, while consumer 
advocates call for clarity and concise, consumer-friendly language. 
Notices that support individual choice about subsequent use of 
personal information, often are written in language that allows 
companies such latitude that consent authorizes nearly any data use. 
As a result, notices are often perceived as doing little to promote the 
individual’s informed decisions about whether or not to provide his 
or her data. 
Rapid changes in technology further strain the ability of 
companies to provide useful notice. Ubiquitous deployment of 
sensors, advances in big data, real-time analytics, and the complex 
                                                
 7 APEC: Privacy Framework, ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION (2005) 
http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-and-Investment/~/media/Files/ 
Groups/ECSG/05_ecsg_privacyframewk.ashx. 
 8 As discussed here, articulations of fair information practices take different 
forms in different jurisdictions. Issues related to individual awareness and notice 
can be found within all of them. In this paper, the starting point of the analysis is 
the fair information practices as the FTC and the White House have articulated 
them. The FTC’s version has been criticized as being too limited and as having 
excluded several important principles (e.g., purpose specification). The White 
House adopted a more inclusive version of the Fair Information Practice 
Principles (FIPPs) in its 2012 Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights. Moreover, in 
current discussions of privacy governance, some companies have returned to 
analysis of a more comprehensive articulation of fair information practices as they 
seek guidance that addresses issues raised by big data analytics, fosters 
interoperability with non-US privacy laws, and promotes robust global data flows. 
Achieving the openness described in the first principle challenges organizations 
regardless of which version of fair information practices they adopted. 
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vendor relationships and data sharing partnerships that characterize 
today’s data ecosystem challenge organizations’ ability to explain 
their data practices. The need to use data robustly and in innovative 
ways clashes with requirements that notices specify a particular 
purpose or use for the data collected. The degree to which data 
collection is integrated into infrastructures (such as intelligent 
vehicle highway systems) or environments (such as retail locations 
or public spaces) can make posting notice difficult, and new 
technologies such as mobile devices with small screens create new 
challenges for providing meaningful notice. 
Currently, a single privacy notice is expected to support many 
functions, including regulation, consumer choice, and public 
education about data practices. This Article argues that the current 
and emerging data ecosystems call for considering whether the 
current notice model can continue to serve all of these purposes. 
Moreover, it raises the question whether notices alone can create the 
conditions necessary to ensure that there are “no personal data 
record-keeping systems whose very existence is secret” as stated in 
the first principle of fair information practices.9 
This Article argues that to achieve the openness required by the 
first fair information practice principle, data protection and privacy 
should move from a “notice” model to one of “transparency.” It also 
asserts that the terms “notice” and “transparency” are not 
synonymous and that different definitions apply to each. It also 
defines notice as the posted articulation of a company’s privacy 
practices and policies. In contrast, transparency is a condition of 
disclosure and openness jointly created by companies and policy 
makers through the use of a variety of approaches, including notice. 
This Article argues that notice is an essential tool for creating 
transparency, but that establishing transparency requires far more 
than notice. It requires implementing the measures necessary to 
create an environment of transparency. Whether transparency is 
achieved depends not only on the posting of information but also on 
                                                
 9 Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens, supra note 2. 
522 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 17: 515 
the perceived quality of the disclosure.10 It argues that the Authors’ 
experience with notice over the last twenty years demonstrates that 
a single notice cannot fully inform consumers, regulators, and the 
public about data practices. Rather, to achieve the transparency 
required by the first principle of fair information practices—
particularly given the complexity of the emerging data eco-
system—organizations must employ a variety of tools that support 
the various functions notice alone was once intended to serve. 
Creating a transparent data environment requires an understanding 
of these functions. It also involves understanding the limitations of 
traditional notice. Importantly, it requires identifying the various 
audiences that must be served and the needs of each. 
This Article also reviews the history of notice in the United 
States and its traditional role in privacy and data protection. It 
considers the challenges and limitations of notice; the attempts of 
business, government, experts, and technologists to address them; 
and the lessons learned from these efforts. It also examines the 
implications of emerging technologies and data uses for notices. 
Finally, it proposes ways in which effective transparency can be 
achieved, including the role of notice. It is important to note that this 
Article is limited to the issues related to notice and to fostering 
transparency. The authors recognize the importance of the full 
complement of fair information practice principles and that 
transparency alone is not sufficient to assure the fair use of data. The 
authors also recognize the importance of meaningful choice or 
consent and that notice as it is currently implemented is the 
mechanism by which individuals now learn about their opportunity 
to consent or choose if available.11 However, issues related to the 
current implementation of the other fair information practices 
principles are beyond the scope of this Article. 
                                                
 10 See A.K. Schnackenberg and E.C. Tomilson, Organizational Transparency: 
A New Perspective on Managing Trust in Organization-Stakeholder 
Relationships, JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT 1, 5 (2014). 
 11 The history of notice reflected in this paper is admittedly limited to the United 
States. However, many of the strengths and limitations of notice revealed by this 
experience are relevant across jurisdictions. 
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II. BACKGROUND: A HISTORY OF NOTICE 
In his seminal work, Privacy and Freedom, Alan Westin 
discussed individuals’ awareness about the collection, processing, 
and storage of data as one means to protect against the unfair 
treatment that can result when inaccurate information is used or 
shared to make decisions about them.12 His work emphasized that 
when individuals do not know that information systems exist, they 
cannot challenge either a particular use or disclosure, or the 
decisions that result.13 
Notice first emerged as a mechanism to achieve awareness and 
a basis for promoting legitimate use of personal information when 
large-scale computerized systems emerged in the 1970s. In the 
1990s, the Internet and e-commerce renewed discussion about the 
need to provide notice to individuals about the collection and use of 
personal data. This Article briefly reviews the evolution of notice in 
the United States beginning in the 1970s through the release in 2012 
of major privacy reports by both the White House and the Federal 
Trade Commission.14 This Article also discusses how 21st century 
technologies such as mobile applications, big data analytics, and the 
Internet of Things challenge the utility of traditional notice and the 
ability to effectively provide it. 
A. The Origins of Notice 
In the early 1970s, then Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, Elliot Richardson, established the Secretary’s Advisory 
Committee on Automated Data Systems in response to growing 
public concerns about the harmful consequences of widespread use 
                                                
 12 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (New York: Antheneum, 1970). 
In particular, see Chapter 7, “The Revolution in Information Collection and 
Processing: Data Surveillance.” 
 13 Id. at 160. 
 14  We limit our review to the evolution of notice as an element of fair 
information principles in the United States. For a comparative analysis of fair 
information principles outside the U.S., see FRED H. CATE, THE FAILURE OF FAIR 
INFORMATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES, IN CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF 
THE INFORMATION ECONOMY (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006) (“Failure of Fair 
Information Practice Principles”). 
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of computer and telecommunications technology. 15  The 
Committee’s report, Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, 
articulated the original Code of Fair Information Practices. The first 
of these states that, “[t]here must be no personal-data recording 
keeping systems whose very existence is secret.”16 The report called 
for any organization maintaining an administrative personal data 
system to provide public notice once a year and detailed what 
information the notice should include.17 
In 1974, Congress passed the Privacy Act,18 designed to regulate 
the federal government’s collection and protection of information 
about citizens.19 The Act’s key requirements are based on principles 
of fair information practices.20 The Privacy Act also called for the 
creation of the Privacy Protection Study Commission (“PPSC”), 
charging it with examining a wide range of record-keeping practices 
and privacy issues arising in the public sector and in a variety of 
commercial environments.21 In its 1977 report, the PPSC articulated 
objectives for data protection systems 22  and reiterated the 
                                                
 15 Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens, supra note 2. 
 16 Id. For a more complete history of the Code, see Robert Gellman, Fair 
Information Practices: A Basic History, Version 2.12, August 2014, available at 
http://www.bobgellman.com. 
 17 Id. at 49. 
 18 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2016). 
 19  The Privacy Act requires agencies collecting information to, inter alia, 
“inform each individual whom it asks to supply information, on the form which it 
uses to collect the information or on a separate form that can be retained by the 
individual— (A) the authority (whether granted by statute, or by executive order 
of the President) which authorizes the solicitation of the information and whether 
disclosure of such information is mandatory or voluntary; (B) the principal 
purpose or purposes for which the information is intended to be used; (C) the 
routine uses which may be made of the information, as published pursuant to 
paragraph (4)(D) of this subsection; and (D) the effects on him, if any, of not 
providing all or any part of the requested information . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 522 (e)(3) 
[hereinafter PRIVACY]. 
 20 Fair Information Practices (FIPS) refer to a set of principles designed to guide 
organization in the collection, use and protection of personal data. They serve as 
a basis for law and self-regulation throughout the world. 
 21  Personal Privacy in an Information Society: The Report of the Privacy 
Protection Study Commission, supra note 3. 
 22 Privacy Act of 1974 Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 § 5, as amended by 
Act of June 1, 1977 Pub. L. No. 95-38, 91 Stat. 179, established the Privacy 
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importance of openness to fairness. The report included 
recommendations related to a variety of data uses, among them 
direct marketing mailing lists.23 The PPSC was asked to investigate 
whether a party that engages in interstate commerce and maintains 
a mailing list should be required to remove an individual’s name and 
address from that list, absent an exception in law.24 However, the 
report instead recommended that private sector organizations that 
share their mailing lists with third parties provide notice of this 
practice to the individuals on the list and provide an opportunity for 
individuals to opt out of sharing. 25  The report recommendation 
effectively articulated what is now referred to as “notice and choice” 
for the first time.26 
                                                
Protection Study Commission and provided that the Commission study data 
banks, automated data processing programs and information systems of 
government, regional and private organizations to determine standards and 
procedures in force for protection of personal information. It further charged the 
Commission with reporting to the President and Congress the extent to which 
requirements and principles of the Privacy Act should be applied to the 
information practices of those organizations, and that making other legislative 
recommendations to protect the privacy of individuals while meeting government 
and society’s legitimate need for information. See PRIVACY, supra note 19. 
 23 Privacy Act, supra note 22. 
 24 Privacy Act of 1974 § 5(c)(2)(B)(i). 
 25 PRIVACY, supra note 19. See Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information 
Practices Principles in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE INFORMATION 
ECONOMY (Jane K. Winn ed., Ashgate Publishing 2006). In 1997, the Direct 
Marketing Association voted to make compliance with this form of “notice and 
choice” a requirement for DMA membership beginning in 1999. See DIRECT 
MARKETING ASS’N, PRIVACY PROMISE: MEMBER COMPLIANCE GUIDE (1999). 
 26 Notice became an established global principle for privacy in 1980 when the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) issued its 
Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flow of 
Personal Data (c(80)58/FINAL) (Sept. 23, 1980 amended on July 11, 2013), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotec 
tionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm#top. These guidelines have 
served as the basis for law, regulation, international agreement and industry best 
practices, most notably the European Union’s Directive 95/46/EC on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L 281), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection; supra note 7. 
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B. Online Privacy and Notice 
In the 1990s, the promise of a new National Information 
Infrastructure27 (“NII”) brought with it recognition that new privacy 
risks threatened the benefits the Internet promised. In 1993, Vice 
President Gore created the Information Infrastructure Task Force 
(“IITF”), and he charged it with developing comprehensive policies 
and programs that would promote the development of the NII.28 A 
Privacy Working Group was created within the IITF, and in June 
1995 it released Privacy and the National Information 
Infrastructure: Principles for Providing and Using Personal 
Information. 29  Included was a notice principle requiring that 
individuals be given sufficient information to make an informed 
decision about his or her privacy. 30  The role of notice was 
subsequently reinforced in the 1997 White House Framework for 
Global Electronic Commerce,31 which stated that the IITF privacy 
principles, built on the 1980 OECD Guidelines, 32  require that 
“[d]ata-gatherers should inform consumer what information they are 
collecting and how they intend to use such data[.]”33 
In the 1990s, the FTC began a separate consumer privacy 
initiative to examine and understand online privacy issues. In 1996, 
it reported that participants in a workshop on online privacy 
generally agreed that notice of information practices is a first 
principle, essential to advancing privacy online; they disagreed, 
                                                
 27 The term “NII” resulted from the High Performance Computing Act of 1991 
(Pub L. No. 102-94,15 U.S.C. §5501). It became a popular buzzword during the 
Clinton Administration. 
 28 Options for Promoting Privacy on the National Information Infrastructure: 
Draft for Public Comment, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. (Apr. 1, 1997), 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/legacy-page/options-promoting-privacy-142716. 
 29  Privacy and the National Information Infrastructure: Principles for 
Providing and Using Personal Information, Final Report, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUM. SERV. (June 6, 1995), http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/niiprivp.htm. 
 30 Id. 
 31 President William Clinton, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, 
THE WHITE HOUSE (July 1, 1997), http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/ 
Commerce/read.html [hereinafter The White House]. 
 32 OECD, supra note 26. 
 33 The White House, supra note 31. 
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however, about the substance of privacy notices.34 In 1998, the FTC 
analyzed the content of a sample of commercial websites to 
determine how many of them posted privacy notices, and among 
those that did, whether those notices contained the core elements of 
fair information practices.35 In its resulting report to Congress, the 
FTC asserted “the most fundamental principle is notice.” 36 
Georgetown University and the FTC conducted follow-up sweeps 
in 1999 and 2000, respectively. 37  While Congress did not enact 
comprehensive federal online privacy legislation as a result of these 
findings, online privacy notices nonetheless emerged as a best 
practice. However, in 2003 California enacted the California Online 
Privacy Protection Act,38 which required operators of commercial 
websites that collected personal information from California 
residents to post a privacy notice that meets certain requirements.39 
Because online businesses typically serve a national audience 
                                                
 34 Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report: Public Workshop on Consumer 
Privacy on the Global Information Infrastructure (Dec. 1996), 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/staff-report-public-workshop-consumer-privacy-
global-information-infrastructure. The Report also stated that there was general 
agreement that in addition to notice, organizations should offer choice, provide 
access, secure and maintain the quality of the personal information in their 
custody. Id. 
 35 This research was also described as a “web sweep.” Websites included in the 
sample were first reviewed to see if they collected personal information. If it did, 
the website was further examined to determine whether it posted a privacy notice, 
and if so, whether it mentioned how the website used the information, whether it 
offered choice about how this information was used, and if there were any 
statements about access or security. 
 36 Privacy Online: Report to Congress, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 7 (June 1998), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-report-
congress/priv-23a.pdf. 
 37 “Self-Regulation and Privacy Online,” FTC Report to Congress, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (July 13, 1999), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/ 
1999/07/self-regulation-and-privacy-online-ftc-report-congress; Privacy Online: 
Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace: A Report to Congress, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, 13 (May 2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-electronic-marketpl 
ace-federal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000text.pdf. In the 2000 sweep, the 
FTC found that only 41% of sites in its random sample and 60% of the “Most 
Popular Group” met basic standards of notice and choice. Id. 
 38 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575-22579 (West 2003). 
 39 Id. 
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independent of where they are based, the California law effectively 
imposed a requirement for all U.S. online businesses to post a 
privacy notice.40 
Both the White House and the FTC revisited notice when they 
issued major reports on privacy in 2012.41 The reports discuss notice 
in the context of transparency.42 In each report, notice remains the 
fundamental mechanism for providing transparency to consumers.43 
The White House Report extensively references notice in its 
discussion of transparency, highlighting its role, the challenges 
faced by organizations providing notice in light of emerging 
technology, and the significance of the consumer-company 
relationship in determining how notice is provided.44 In its report, 
the FTC emphasized greater transparency as one means to advance 
its consumer privacy goals.45 It argued for measures that could make 
companies’ data practices more transparent, including improved 
privacy notices that promote information practices and enable 
consumers to compare privacy practices among organizations and 
choose among them on that basis.46 
In summary, over more than four decades the privacy 
discussions in the United States have centered on a common theme: 
technology holds the potential to provide enormous benefit to the 
economy, firms and individuals, if the privacy concerns raised by 
successive generations of technology are addressed. Notice, despite 
                                                
 40 California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003, COOLEY ALERT! (June 
2004), https://cooley.com/files/ALERT-Cal_OPPA.pdf. 
 41 Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for Protecting 
Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy, THE WHITE 
HOUSE (Feb. 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-
final.pdf [hereinafter Consumer Data Privacy]; Protecting Consumer Privacy in 
an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for Businesses and Policymakers, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N (March 1, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-
privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf 
[hereinafter Protecting Consumer Privacy]. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Consumer Data Privacy, supra note 41. 
 45 Protecting Consumer Privacy, supra note 41. The report also highlighted 
simplified consumer choice and privacy-by-design. Id. 
 46 Id. 
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its limitations, remains the primary method for promoting awareness 
and addressing these privacy concerns. We now discuss the role of 
traditional privacy notices, their challenges and limitations. 
III.    THE ROLES OF TRADITIONAL NOTICE 
Since the principles of fair information practices were 
articulated in the 1970s, traditional notice has evolved to serve many 
functions for individuals, businesses, regulators, advocates, and the 
media. 
A. Supporting Consumer Privacy Decisions 
Perhaps the essential role for notice is to inform individuals’ 
decisions about the use of their personal information. In theory, 
notice supports autonomy by raising awareness and placing 
decisions in the hands of the individual.47 As described above, there 
is widespread agreement that awareness promotes fairness and is the 
first principle of fair information use. Notice provides the basis for 
two types of decisions. First, if choice or consent is available, the 
information in notices about an organization’s data practices helps 
individuals decide whether to engage with the organization or to 
allow subsequent uses of their personal information. Second, notices 
enable individuals who value privacy to compare the practices of 
different organizations and to choose which companies they wish to 
do business with based on the firm’s data practices. Privacy notices 
then could serve as the basis for a market solution for privacy. 
B. Supporting a Market Solution for Privacy 
In 1997, the Clinton Administration released A Framework for 
Global Electronic Commerce, 48  outlining the Administration’s 
strategy for increasing consumer and business confidence in the use 
of electronic networks for commerce. 49  After consulting with 
industry, consumer groups, and the Internet community, the 
Administration issued five principles to guide government support 
                                                
 47 Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1027, 1049 (2012). 
 48 A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, supra note 31. 
 49 Id. 
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for the development of electronic commerce. 50  It made 
recommendations about three types of issues where international 
agreements are needed to preserve the Internet as a minimally-
regulated medium, one in which competition and consumer choice 
would shape the marketplace.51 
In its discussion of privacy, the Framework 52  notes that the 
privacy principles it articulates build on the OECD Guidelines.53 
The Framework focuses on precepts of awareness and choice and 
emphasizes that: 
[d]isclosure by data-gatherers is designed to simulate market resolution 
of privacy concerns by empowering individuals to obtain relevant 
knowledge about why information is being collected, what the 
information will be used for, what steps will be taken to protect that 
information, the consequences of providing or withholding information, 
and any rights of redress that they may have. Such disclosure will enable 
consumers to make better judgments about the levels of privacy available 
and their willingness to participate.54 
The Framework further noted that in the interest of fostering 
unimpeded flows of data on the Internet, the U.S. would engage its 
trading partners in discussions to build support for industry-
developed solutions to privacy and for market-driven mechanisms 
to promote consumer satisfaction about how their data is handled.55 
                                                
 50 See id. The five principles include: 1) The private sector should leave, 2) 
Governments should avoid undue restrictions on electronic commerce, 3) Where 
government involvement is needed, its aim should be to support and enforce a 
predictable, minimalist, consistent and simple legal environment for commerce, 
4) Governments should recognize the unique qualities of the Internet, 5) 
Electronic Commerce over the Internet should be facilitated on a global basis. Id. 
 51 Id. at 6. The three issue areas are financial issues related to customs, taxation, 
and electronic payments; legal issues including a UCC for e-commerce, 
intellectual property, privacy, and security; and market access issues including 
information technology, content, and technical standards. 
 52 Id. 
 53 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (2013), 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtr
ansborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm. 
 54 Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, supra note 31, at 17. 
 55 Id.; Privacy and Self Regulation in the Information Age, U.S. DEPT. OF COM. (1994), 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/1997/privacy-and-self-regulation-information-age. 
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To realize this vision of a market solution for privacy, in the mid-
1990s, the Department of Commerce engaged in a concerted effort 
to urge companies to post privacy notices.56 Based on the privacy 
practices articulated in notices posted across the commercial sector, 
individuals could inform themselves, compare notices, and 
determine whether or not to do business with a particular company, 
or whether to choose to look elsewhere for a good or service. Privacy 
could serve as a brand differentiator, arguably attracting individuals 
who valued companies that collected, shared, and used data 
responsibly.57 
The Clinton Administration’s Framework also reinforced the 
role of private sector leadership, and that market forces should guide 
the development of the Internet. Further, the Internet should not be 
subject to unnecessary regulation.58 The Administration emphasized 
that even in situations where collective action was called for, 
government should encourage industry self-regulation and private 
sector leadership wherever possible. 59  It highlighted the need to 
support the efforts of private sector organizations to develop 
mechanisms to facilitate the successful operation of the Internet.60 
The National Telecommunication and Information 
Administration of the Department of Commerce (“NTIA”) 
highlighted this support for self-regulation as a mechanism to 
protect privacy and published a compendium of papers authored by 
experts in law, economics, and business, which examined the 
strengths and limitations of self-regulation as an approach to 
                                                
 56 See, e.g, Privacy and the NII: Safeguarding Telecommunications-Related 
Personal Information, US DEPT. OF COM. (October 1995), available at 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/privwhitepaper.html. 
 57 Eli M. Noam, Privacy and Self-Regulation: Markets for Electronic Privacy, 
COLUM. U., http://www.citi.columbia.edu/elinoam/articles/priv_self.htm (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2016); Privacy and Self-Regulation in an Information Age, supra, 
note 54; Hal Varian, Economic Aspects of Personal Privacy, U. OF CAL. BERKLEY 
(Dec. 6, 1996), http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/privacy. 
 58 Privacy and the NII: Safeguarding Telecommunications-Related Personal 
Information, supra note 56. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
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protecting personal information.61 In a paper titled “Markets, Self-
Regulation, and Government Enforcement in the Protection of 
Personal Information,”62 Peter Swire describes self-regulation as a 
governance instrument that encompasses each of the functions of the 
three branches of government – legislation, enforcement, and 
adjudication. He discusses the work of industry groups to develop 
and issue codes for privacy. In some instances, he argues, the 
guidelines themselves serve no enforcement function, but are made 
available to industry groups, government, and the public.63 But in 
others, the codes incorporate enforcement provisions. He further 
discusses the role of industry groups in adjudicating complaints and 
initiating enforcement actions.64 His paper also lays out the strengths 
of self-regulation—its ability to benefit from industry expertise, to 
create flexible guidance that keeps pace with industry 
developments, and to stave off government regulation that may be 
too prescriptive and therefore limit innovation.65 
In these early stages, industry-wide codes of conduct (as 
opposed to company-specific practices) served as an important tool 
in FTC enforcement of the terms of notices. 66  Collective self-
regulatory groups arguably are positioned to use market dynamics 
to encourage adherence to industry “best practices” on the theory 
that no company can afford to be viewed as indifferent to the privacy 
concerns of the public.67 Moreover, in contrast to the self-regulatory 
efforts of individual companies, self-regulatory groups can adopt 
collective mechanisms to investigate and resolve consumer 
                                                
 61 Privacy and Self Regulation in the Information Age, U.S. DEPT. OF COM. 
(June 12, 1997), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/1997/privacy-and-
self-regulation-information-age. 
 62 See Peter Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement in 
the Protection of Personal Information, U.S. DEPT. OF COM. (June 12, 1997) 3–
19, available at https://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/chapter-1-theory-markets-and-
privacy. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Swire’s analysis also highlights the limitations of the “pro-self-regulation” 
argument. See id. 
 66 CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FED. TRADE COMM’N. PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 
175–81 (2016). 
 67 Id. 
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complaints and thus enforce each company’s compliance with a 
given industry’s best practices. 68  FTC oversight—in conjunction 
with that of state and local authorities—complements such self-
regulatory enforcement by providing an independent legal incentive 
for each member company, and the group as a whole, to live up to 
its promised standard of behavior. 
An early example of such a code was developed by the Online 
Privacy Alliance (“OPA”).69 Formed in 1998 as a cross-industry 
coalition of more than 80 global companies,70  the OPA’s stated 
mission was “to lead and support self-regulatory initiatives that 
create an environment of trust for online privacy.”71 It developed 
standards of conduct that were tailored to the online environment 
and which required that all members adopt and post a privacy 
policy.72 The organization established guidelines for online privacy 
notices, a framework for self-regulatory enforcement, and a special 
policy concerning collection of information from children. It also 
required that its members adhere to the guidelines and policies, 
which the organization posted on its website. The OPA’s guidance 
focused on notice to consumers; limitations on purposes and onward 
transfers; data quality; access to data and correction; security; and 
collection of data from children.73 OPA’s comments on its notice 
requirements reflected the role of privacy policies in informed 
consumer choice and promoting the use of market forces to 
encourage good privacy practices.74 
                                                
 68 Id. 
 69 See Privacy Alliance, ONLINE PRIVACY ALLIANCE, 
http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources (last visited Apr. 14, 2016). The OPA 
is no longer active. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 The data privacy standards announced by the Individual Reference Services 
Group (“IRSG”)—an association of fourteen major companies in the individual 
reference services industry—are another instance of a cross industry effort to 
establish standards of conduct as the basis for self-regulation. Individual 
Reference Services:  A Report to Congress, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 1997), 
https://www.ftc.gov/reports/individual-reference-services-report-congress. The 
individual reference services industry gathers personal information about 
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C.  Serving as a Basis for Regulation: The Federal Trade 
Commission 
In theory, notice is an attractive regulatory vehicle for several 
reasons. It is based on an assumption that information provides the 
basis for better individual decisions when individual preferences 
vary. Notices also allow for flexibility in an environment 
characterized by a wide variety of business models. A notice regime 
is also relatively easy to enforce, as regulators only have to verify 
that the description of the practices is accurate. Notices differ from 
warnings, as the purpose of warnings is to prevent a high-risk 
activity related to health or safety, while the goal of a notice is to 
inform decisions.75 
                                                
individuals from a number of sources, both public (e.g., state driving records) and 
private (e.g., credit information) and provides that information for a fee to privacy 
parties and the government. Id. To protect the often-sensitive personal data with 
which IRSG members deal on a day-to-day basis, the group has adopted binding 
standards for the protection of personal information. Id. The IRSG developed 
these rules with the advice and participation of the FTC, and the agency endorsed 
them as a promising mechanism to “lessen the risk that information made 
available through [individual reference] services is misused . . . [and] address 
consumers concerns about the privacy of non-public information in the services 
databases.” Id. 
 75 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl Schneider, The Failure of Mandated 
Discourse, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011); Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism 
in Privacy (And Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027 (2012); Archon Fung, 
Mary Graham & David Weil, Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of 
Transparency, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2007. 
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Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act76 empowers the 
FTC to investigate and halt any “unfair”77 or “deceptive”78 conduct 
in almost all industries affecting interstate commerce. 79  This 
authority includes the right to investigate a company’s compliance 
with its own asserted data privacy protection policies. Pursuant to 
                                                
 76 15 U.S.C § 45 (2012). 
 77 The FTC has articulated three elements of deception as: (1) there must be a 
representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer; (2) the 
act or practice must be considered from the perspective of the reasonable 
consumer; and (3) the representation, omission or practice must be material. See 
FTC Policy Statement on Deception, FED. TRADE COMM’N. (Oct. 14, 1983), 
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1983/10/ftc-policy-statement-deception 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2016). In In re Gateway Learning Corp., the FTC alleged 
that Gateway committed unfair and deceptive trade practices by making 
retroactive changes to its privacy policy without informing customers and by 
violating its own privacy policy by selling customer information when it had said 
it would not. Gateway Learning Corp., In the Matter of, FED. TRADE COMM’N. 
(Dec. 28, 2004), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/042-
3047/gateway-learning-corp-matter. Gateway settled the complaint by entering 
into a consent decree with the FTC that required it to surrender some profits and 
placed restrictions upon Gateway for the following 20 years.  Id. 
 78 Courts have identified three main factors that must be considered in consumer 
unfairness cases: (1) whether the practice injures consumers; (2) whether the 
practice violates established public policy; and (3) whether it is unethical or 
unscrupulous. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244–45 n.5 (1972). 
The Circuit Courts have concluded that this quotation reflected the Supreme 
Court’s own views. See Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, n.8 (7th Cir. 1976); 
see Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 323 (9th Cir. 1974). Since then the Commission 
has continued to refine the standard of unfairness in its cases and rules, and it has 
now reached a more detailed sense of both the definition and the limits of these 
criteria. See FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, FED. TRADE COMM’N. (Dec. 
17, 1980), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-
unfairness (last visited Apr. 14, 2016). 
 79 In addition to its Section 5 authority, the FTC is delegated broad enforcement 
power under a variety of statutes designed to promote fair competition and protect 
the interests of consumers. Certain of these statutes—like the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act—specifically empower the FTC to investigate and prosecute 
violations of U.S. law governing the treatment of specific types of information 
relating to an individual’s credit and finances. Others—like the Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Act of 1998—grant the FTC authority to regulate certain data 
protection practices and dictate minimum standards for the collection and 
distribution of discrete types of personal information (e.g., data relating to 
children). 
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Section 5, the FTC may issue cease and desist orders and may also 
order other equitable relief, including redress of damages.80  The 
FTC acts under this power to investigate organizations whose 
practices do not conform to the policy articulated in the privacy 
notice and to provide oversight and enforcement for the U.S. self-
regulatory regime in the absence of an omnibus consumer privacy 
law.81 
1. GeoCities 
The first FTC enforcement action against a website operator, the 
GeoCities82 case, demonstrated the FTC’s use of Section 5 to require 
companies to operate in accordance with their posted information 
protection practices. 83  In GeoCities, the FTC challenged the 
accuracy of the company’s posted representations about the use of 
marketing information collected from individuals registering at the 
site.84 The FTC’s complaint also alleged that GeoCities implied that 
it operated a website for children but failed to disclose to the 
children or their parents that an independent third party operated the 
site.85 GeoCities denied the allegations, but established information 
policies and procedures in accordance with standards proposed by 
the FTC.86  GeoCities was required to comply with requirements 
                                                
 80 15 U.S.C § 45(a)(2) (2006). 
 81  For a comprehensive discussion of the FTC’s role in oversight and 
enforcement, see D. Solove and W. Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law 
of Privacy, 114 COLUMBIA L. REV. 583, (2014) and CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 2016. 
 82 See GeoCities, Docket No. C-3850 (F.T.C. August 13, 1998). The full case 
materials are available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/ 
982-3015/geocities. 
 83 Id. 
 84 GeoCities, Docket No. C-3850 (F.T.C. February 5, 1999) (Complaint). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Under the terms of the consent order, GeoCities agreed to provide clear and 
prominent notice to consumers of its information practices, including what 
information is collected through its website, the intended uses for that 
information, any third parties to whom that information would be disclosed, the 
means by which a consumer might access information collected and the means by 
which a consumer could have the information removed from the company’s 
databases. GeoCities also agreed that it would not misrepresent the identity of any 
third party that collected data from a website the company promoted or sponsored. 
Finally, GeoCities agreed to contact all consumers from whom it had collected 
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specified in a consent order.87 In addition, the publicity surrounding 
the FTC enforcement action concerning a then-prominent website 
operator motivated other companies to post accurate notices and 
fulfill the promises made in them.88 
2. Toysmart 
In a later case, Toysmart.com agreed to settle charges that the 
company violated Section 5 of the FTC Act by failing to act in 
accordance with representations to consumers that it would never 
share their personal information with third parties. 89  When the 
company ran into financial problems, it attempted to sell all of its 
assets, including detailed personal information about visitors to its 
site—name, address, billing information, shopping preferences, and 
family profiles, including names and birthdates of children— 
contrary to the assertions in the company’s privacy statement.90 On 
July 10, 2000, the FTC filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts against Toysmart to prevent the sale of 
the customer information. 91  The resulting settlement agreement 
forbade the sale of this customer information except under very 
limited circumstances.92 
                                                
personal information and afford those individuals an opportunity to have data 
removed from the data bases both of the company and any third party. See 
GeoCities, Docket No. C-3850 (F.T.C. February 5, 1999) (Consent Order). 
 87 Id. 
 88 See, e.g., CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY 
LAW AND POLICY 2016. 
 89 See Toysmart.com, LLC, Civil Action No. 00-11341-RGS (F.T.C. July 21, 
2000). The full case materials are available at https://www.ftc.gov/ 
enforcement/cases-proceedings/x000075/toysmartcom-llc-toysmartcom-inc. 
 90 Toysmart.com, LLC, Civil Action No. 00-11341-RGS (F.T.C. July 21, 2000) 
(First Amended Complaint). 
 91  In re Toysmart.com, LLC, Case No. 00-13995-CJK (Bankr. E.D. Mass. 
2000). 
 92 Under the settlement agreement, Toysmart was allowed only to sell customer 
lists as part of a package which included the entire website, and only to an entity 
that expressly agreed to abide by the terms of the Toysmart privacy statement and 
to follow certain procedures if it wished to change the policy. See Toysmart.com, 
LLC, Civil Action No. 00-11341-RGS (F.T.C. July 21, 2000) (Stipulated Consent 
Agreement). 
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3. Microsoft 
In the Microsoft93 case, Microsoft Corporation agreed to settle 
Federal Trade Commission charges regarding the assertions it made 
about the privacy and security of personal information collected 
from consumers through its “Passport” web services. 94  The 
Commission initiated its investigation of the Passport services in 
response to a complaint filed by a coalition of consumer groups led 
by the Electronic Privacy Information Center in July 2001.95 
The consent order prohibited any misrepresentation of 
information practices in connection with Passport and other similar 
services.96 It also required Microsoft to implement and maintain a 
comprehensive information security program. 97  In addition, 
Microsoft was required to have its security program certified as 
meeting or exceeding the standards in the consent order by an 
independent professional every two years.98 
                                                
 93 See Microsoft Corporation, Docket No. C-4069 (F.T.C. December 24, 2002). 
The full case materials are available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/012-3240/microsoft-corporation-matter. 
 94 The FTC also addressed issues of false representations about security in Eli 
Lilly and Company, Docket No. C-4047 (F.T.C. May 10, 2002). The full case 
materials are available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/012-3214/eli-lilly-company-matter. 
 95  According to the Commission’s complaint, Microsoft made false 
representations about (1) the measures it deployed to maintain and protect the 
privacy and confidentiality of consumers’ personal information collected through 
its Passport and Passport Wallet services; (2) the safety and security of the 
purchases made with Passport Wallet compared to purchases made at the same 
site without Passport Wallet; (3) the extent to which Passport did or did not collect 
personally identifiable information; and (4) the extent to which Passport gave 
parents control over information participating Web sites could collect from their 
children. See Microsoft Corporation, Docket No. C-4069 (F.T.C. December 24, 
2002) (Complaint). 
 96 See Microsoft Corporation, Docket No. C-4069 (F.T.C. August 8, 2002) 
(Agreement Containing Consent Order). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
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4. Epic Marketplace 
In a later case, the FTC entered into a settlement with Epic 
Marketplace, 99  an online advertising company, which accessed 
users’ browser histories to deliver targeted advertising.100 The FTC 
found that Epic’s failure to disclose this practice in its privacy 
policies violated Section 5 of the FTC Act.101 The FTC identified a 
data activity and a material omission in a privacy policy.102 It alleged 
a deceptive practice and entered into an enforcement action. 103 
Unlike in previous cases, in which the FTC’s enforcement focused 
on affirmatively inaccurate or false statements as deceptive—for 
example, in the Upromise case104—the Epic case signaled the FTC’s 
inclination to find an organizations’ inadequate disclosure about its 
data practices in itself to be inherently deceptive.105 
According to the FTC complaint, Epic engaged in online 
behavioral advertising by tracking consumers’ online activities to 
deliver targeted advertising specific to each user’s interests, as 
identified based on their browsing history.106 Epic asserted in its 
posted policy that it was merely tracking user visits to sites on Epic’s 
network. 107  In practice, however, Epic obtained users’ browsing 
histories from their browsers in order to deliver advertisements.108 
Epic observed browsing histories to learn about users’ interest in 
sensitive financial and medical topics such as debt relief, personal 
                                                
 99 See Epic Marketplace, Inc., Docket No. C-4389 (F.T.C. March 13, 2013). 
The full case materials are available at: https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/112-3182/epic-marketplace-inc. 
 100  Epic Marketplace, Inc., Docket No. C-4389 (F.T.C. March 13, 2013) 
(Decision and Order). 
 101  Epic Marketplace, Inc., Docket No. C-4389 (F.T.C. March 13, 2013) 
(Complaint). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 The FTC alleged that Upromise’s practice of using a web-browser toolbar 
to collect consumers’ personal information without adequately disclosing the 
extent of the information it is collecting is deceptive. See Upromise, Inc., Docket 
No. C-4351 (F.T.C. March 27, 2012). The full case materials are available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/102-3116/upromise-inc. 
 105 See supra note 99. 
 106 See supra note 101. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
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bankruptcy, incontinence, and fertility.109 Epic’s tracking practices 
involved not only monitoring Epic’s network, but also gathering 
data from other sites as well, despite the claims to the contrary in the 
company’s privacy policy. 
D. Informing the Public Dialogue about Data Use and Protection 
An organization’s posted notices make its data and privacy 
practices public. Notices enable non-governmental organizations, 
advocates, and the press to monitor an individual company’s activity 
with respect to data. Taken together, the notices posted by 
companies provide a window into the evolution of data-gathering 
technology and data practices across industry. In doing so, privacy 
notices and the information they make available foster a public 
conversation about data collection and use, and make possible a role 
for the public in the debate about how data is used and protected. In 
some instances,110 privacy watchdogs, advocacy organizations, and 
interested individuals have discovered discrepancies in privacy 
notices or have tested a company’s practices against the assertions 
in their notice and then brought their findings to the press and 
regulators.111 
The complaint against Facebook brought before the FTC by the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) in 2010 provides 
one example.112 EPIC alleged business practices it believed to be 
unfair and deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act, including 
Facebook’s disclosure of users’ personal information to its partners 
without first obtaining users’ consent, its disclosure of personal 
information to which users previously restricted access, and its 
disclosure of the information to the public when users elected to 
make that information available to friends only.113 Central to EPIC’s 
complaint was a detailed review of the representations in 
                                                
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112  In re Facebook, Inc., No. C-4365, (F.T.C. 2012), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/092-3184/facebook-inc. 
(The web site includes all the materials for the case). 
 113  Epic Complaint to F.T.C. (Dec. 17, 2009), available at 
https://epic.org/privacy/inrefacebook/EPIC-FacebookComplaint.pdf. 
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Facebook’s posted privacy policy and a comparison of those 
assertions against what EPIC asserted were actual information 
practices.114 This complaint led the FTC to issue a consent decree 
with Facebook that bars Facebook from making deceptive privacy 
claims, requires that the company obtain consumers’ approval 
before it changes the way it shares their data, and requires that its 
privacy practices undergo periodic assessment by independent, 
third-party auditors for the ensuing 20 years.115 
E. Providing an Opportunity for Internal Review of Data 
Practices 
The development and articulation of an accurate, current privacy 
notice requires considerable effort on the part of companies. To 
write a clear, comprehensive notice requires an understanding of the 
types of data the organization collects; the points and methods of 
collection; how data is used and with whom it is shared; where and 
how it is stored and how long it is kept; and how it is secured and 
protected from loss, wrongful access, or inappropriate use. It also 
requires that companies understand the data protection and privacy 
rules and laws that apply. 
In conducting the inventory necessary to understand the 
company’s data practices, organizations are given the opportunity to 
ask questions and make decisions about data. What do I collect? Do 
I need to collect it to carry out a particular function? With whom do 
I share data? Do I trust that third party to use data responsibly? How 
is the data secured? Have the circumstances of storage and the 
                                                
 114 For example, Facebook has represented, expressly or by implication that, 
through their Profile Privacy Settings, users can restrict access to their profile 
information to specific groups, such as “Only Friends” or “Friends of Friends.” In 
truth and in fact, in many instances, users could not restrict access to their profile 
information to specific groups, such as “Only Friends” or “Friends of Friends” 
through their Profile Privacy Settings. Instead, such information could be 
accessed by Platform Applications that their Friends used. See In re Facebook, 
Inc., No. C-4365, (F.T.C. 2012) (Complaint), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/092-3184/facebook-inc. 
 115   In re Facebook, Inc., File No. 092 3184, (F.T.C. 2011) (Agreement 
Containing Consent Order), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/cases/2011/11/111129facebookagree.pdf. 
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threats of data intrusion changed since these security practices were 
last reviewed? 
While not originally envisioned to function in this way, the 
drafting of a privacy notice provides a company with an opportunity 
to inventory and assess internal practices, making sure they are up 
to date, necessary, and appropriate. It can also serve as a platform 
for decision-making about whether to continue with a data practice 
or deployment of technology in light of considerations related to 
brand, and developments in law, policy, or market practices. 
However, it provides the added benefit of helping companies 
keep abreast of data collection and use across the organization, stay 
aware of the privacy impact and potential risk of data use, and make 
reasoned decisions about appropriate data use and protection.116 
IV.  CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT NOTICES 
Critics of notice often argue that notices are of limited utility.117 
They assert notices are not useful because they are not drafted in a 
way that makes them useful to individuals; they also argue that 
because meaningful choice is rarely available to individuals, notice 
is no longer needed to inform individual choice. This Section 
addresses these arguments. 
A. Notices are often found to be complex, unclear, and too lengthy 
to be useful to consumers or to support meaningful choice. 
In the United States no omnibus federal law requires 
organizations to post notices. As a result, companies post notices to 
comply with state laws such as the California Online Privacy 
Protection Act of 2003118 or they post notices voluntarily. The FTC 
generally has not articulated requirements about format, length, 
                                                
 116 See Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1060 (2012). 
 117 FRED H. CATE, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE INFORMATION 
ECONOMY 360–63 (Jane K. Winn, 2006). 
 118  The Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003, CAL BUS. & PROF. CODE 
§§ 22575-22579 (2004), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/ 
codes_displayText.xhtml?lawCode=BPC&division=8.&title=&part=&chapter=
22.&article=. 
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readability, or content of a given privacy notice.119 As discussed 
above, the FTC brings actions based on unfair or deceptive practices 
to hold companies to whatever assertions they make in their posted 
policy.120 Thus, even if law does not require a company to post a 
notice, once a company does post a notice, it is subject to 
enforcement of its terms. Because a company potentially incurs 
liability by posting a notice, corporate counsel offices are 
understandably motivated to limit legal exposure and draft notices 
that are lengthy and legalistic. 121  As a result, notices lack the 
attributes needed to provide consumers with what they need to know 
about an organization’s data and privacy practices. Moreover, 
notices were originally intended to facilitate a one-on-one 
relationship between individuals and websites. Today, the complex 
technologies, business models and data practices, and networks of 
vendor relationships that support digital services (e.g., Internet of 
Things, cloud computing, big data, behavioral advertising) are 
difficult to explain and challenge attempts to draft simple, readable 
notices. It has been suggested that even if at a given moment a notice 
could reasonably describe an organization’s information flows and 
data protection measures, the rapid change in technology, analytics, 
and business relationships can quickly render it inaccurate.122 
To make traditional privacy notices useful to individuals, 
drafters face the challenge of communicating large amounts of 
complex, often technical information in a succinct, reader-friendly 
way. The notices that result often are hard to read (and even more 
difficult to understand), read infrequently, and do not support 
                                                
 119 One exception is the GLB model form that specified content and format for 
GLB privacy notices. See infra Part V.C.1. 
 120 See supra Part III.C. 
 121 For example, one longitudinal study hypothesized that concerns about FTC 
enforcement actions resulted in a decrease in readability of privacy notices from 
2001 to 2003. See George R. Milne, Mary J. Culnan and Henry Greene, A 
Longitudinal Assessment of Online Privacy Notice Readability, 26 J. OF PUB. 
POL’Y AND MKTG., 238, 249 (2006). 
 122 Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, DAEDALUS, 
32, 36 (2011). 
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rational decision making about privacy.123 Because individuals have 
limited ability to process information, traditional notices often result 
in information overload and do not promote informed decisions.124 
Researchers estimate that the time alone invested in reading the 
privacy notices for the websites an individual visits on average in a 
given year is approximately 201 hours per year per person, 
representing a total national opportunity cost of $781 billion. 125 
Further, privacy notices are only one type of disclosure that 
individuals encounter in a typical day, resulting in what Ben-Shahar 
and Schneider describe as the “accumulation problem” where 
people encounter too many disclosures overall to digest the majority 
of them.126 
Whether a notice is clear or not depends upon whether the target 
audience reasonably can be expected to be able to read and 
comprehend it. Research has revealed significant readability issues 
with current privacy notices. 127  For example, Jensen and Potts 
measured readability for online privacy notices for 47 high-traffic 
Web sites and found that on average, these notices had a grade-level 
readability score of 14.2—two years past high school.128 Milne and 
his colleagues conducted a longitudinal assessment of the 
readability of privacy notices of 321 top Web sites based on 
unduplicated visitors.129 The initial grade-level readability score was 
                                                
 123 See, e.g., George R. Milne & Mary J. Culnan, Strategies of Reducing Online 
Privacy Risks: Why Consumers Read (or Don’t Read) Online Privacy Notices, 18 
J. OF INTERACTIVE MKTG., 15, 29 (2004). 
 124 See Calo, supra note 116. 
 125 Alecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy 
Policies, I/S, A J. OF L. AND POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y, (2008), available at 
http://www.is-journal.org. 
 126  Omar Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated 
Disclosures, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 705–08 (2011) (providing an interesting 
illustration of the accumulation problem). 
 127 Carlin Jensen & Colin Potts, Privacy Policies as Decision-Making Tools: 
An Evaluation of Online Privacy Notices, 6 CHI LETTERS 471, 478, (2004). 
 128 Jensen and Potts reviewed 64 privacy policies, analyzing among other things 
their accessibility. They attributed ease of use to how easily it is for consumers to 
locate the policy, a function of where the link is placed and how visible it is to 
users. Id. 
 129 Milne et al., supra note 121. 
MAY 2016] From Privacy Notices to Effective Transparency 545 
11.2—equivalent to some high school.130 Two years later, the grade 
level increased to 12.3 and 58 percent of the notices had increased 
in length.131 Both studies criticized existing notices for being written 
at an educational level exceeding that of a large proportion of the 
population. In a survey of 119 participants, Acquisiti and Grossklags 
found that 41 percent read privacy policies only rarely, even after 
expressing a high degree of concern about privacy.132 Further, recent 
studies also found that a majority of the public incorrectly assumes 
that the existence of a privacy policy necessarily means that the firm 
will protect the confidentiality of all their personal information. 133 
A notice’s usefulness also depends in part on whether or not an 
individual can easily locate it. When privacy notices are difficult to 
access – obscured by their location or posted in lettering that blends 
with other text – they provide little help to individuals attempting to 
understand data practices or choose whether or not to engage with a 
company or use a device or service. 
The FTC addressed this issue in 2009, when it entered into a 
consent decree with Sears Holding Management Corporation.134 The 
FTC enforcement action began after Sears disseminated a 
“research” software application for consumers to download and 
install on their home computers in connection with the “My SHC 
Community” program.135 According to the FTC, Sears represented 
to consumers that this software application, if downloaded and 
                                                
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132  Alessandor Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in 
Individual Decision Making, JAN./FEB. IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 24, 30, 
(2005). 
 133 See Aaron Smith, Half of Online Americans Don’t Know What a Privacy 
Policy Is, FACT TANK, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, (Dec. 4, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/04/half-of-americans-dont-know 
-what-a-privacy-policy-is/; Joseph Turow, Michael Hennessy & Nora Draper, The 
Tradeoff Fallacy, ANNENBERG SCH. FOR COMMC’N., UNIV. OF PENN, (June 2015), 
https://www.asc.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/TradeoffFallacy_1.pdf. 
 134 In the Matter of Sears Holdings Management, Docket No. C-4264 (2009), 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/082-3099/sears-holdings-
management-corporation-corporation-matter. 
 135 Id. 
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installed, would track consumers’ “online browsing” activities.136 
The FTC alleged that Sears failed to disclose to consumers that the 
application would (i) track nearly all of the consumers’ online 
behavior (including information provided in secure sessions with 
third-party websites, shopping carts and online accounts), (ii) track 
certain offline activity on the computer, and (iii) transmit most of 
the tracked information to Sears’ remote computer servers.137 In its 
complaint, the FTC argued that these facts would be material to 
consumers when deciding whether to install the software, and Sears’ 
failure to disclose the information constituted a deception in 
violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.138 The FTC acknowledged the 
application “functioned and transmitted information substantially as 
described in the [Privacy Statement and User License Agreement],” 
but noted that this disclosure was available only in the lengthy 
agreement provided near the end of the multi-step registration 
process.139 
B. Choice is increasingly less meaningful, appropriate and/or 
available to the consumer, raising the question of why notice is 
relevant or necessary at all. 
In the fair information practices principles, choice was 
articulated to allow individuals to limit secondary use when personal 
information was collected for one purpose and used for other 
purposes. 140  In practice, choice is offered for a limited set of 
practices: individuals can opt-out of unwanted marketing email or 
targeted advertising based on their online browsing behavior, but not 
the receipt of online advertising in general.141 
                                                
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 The principle of use limitation is found in the principles of fair information 
practices as articulated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. See Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (2013), 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtr
ansborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm. 
 141 CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND 
POLICY 178 (Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
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Further, as data sharing and processing drives more and more of 
society’s most essential functions, individual choice about the 
collection, processing, and secondary uses of data has become more 
circumscribed. Use of data for socially valuable purposes, e.g., law 
enforcement, locating lost children, tracking deadbeat parents, 
medical research, fraud detection, and network security argue 
against restricting collection and use of certain kinds of data on the 
basis of choice. 
In the emerging data eco-system, characterized by sensor-rich 
environments, complex vendor relationships and analytic 
processing of big data, the ability of individuals to consent to any 
particular instance of data collection or use may be vastly more 
limited than it was in the era when data was collected almost 
exclusively through websites, and where the individual interacted 
with a single entity, typically the web publisher. Given this 
diminished role of consent, some commenters question whether 
notice remains relevant at all.142 
V. ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF NOTICE 
Attempts to address the challenges of informing the individual 
and the limitations of traditional privacy notices have taken two 
forms: (1) efforts to improve written privacy notices - both offline 
notices distributed on paper and online privacy notices and (2) 
efforts to create alternatives to written notices. 
                                                
 142 Cate, supra note 117. Cate argues that a system of data protection based on 
consumer choice no longer works and that notices provide individuals only with 
an “illusion of enhanced privacy.” He describes the proliferation of notices that 
are rarely read and little understood by individuals and asserts that they serve as 
a formality rather than a mechanism that promotes transparency or informs 
individual choice. He highlights in particular that in many cases, services cannot 
be offered subject to individual choice because to make choice available would 
run contrary to other societal interests. Cate proposes an approach that would 
require notice only where collection of data is not reasonably obvious to the 
individual. In contrast to Cate’s view, we believe that even when not used or acted 
upon by consumers, traditional notices remain essential to transparency, serving 
the functions we describe elsewhere in this paper – the basis for enforcement, the 
support for public awareness and action through the activity of the press and 
advocacy community, and the opportunity for internal review of data collection, 
processing and protection practices. 
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A. Efforts to Improve Written Privacy Notices 
In 2001, the FTC and the Centre for Information Policy 
Leadership (“CIPL”) undertook projects to develop a standard 
format for short or layered notices.143 In 2014, NTIA moderated a 
multi-stakeholder process to develop transparency guidelines for 
mobile apps. Both are reviewed below.144 
Early attempts to design short or layered notices were a response 
to the provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 145 
(“GLBA”). GLBA requires that financial institutions issue privacy 
notices to their customers,146 and specifies the content - but not the 
format - of the notice. In December 2001, the eight GLB agencies 
convened a joint public workshop titled “Get Noticed” to examine 
the challenges of providing effective notice and to identify strategies 
for improving the readability of notices required by GLBA. 147 
Subsequently, the Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 148  directed the 
GLB agencies jointly to develop a model form that companies could 
use to issue their GLBA privacy notices. The agencies released a 
model form in March 2007.149 The final rule, issued in the Federal 
                                                
 143 See Centre for Information Policy Leadership, HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, 
https://www.informationpolicycentre.com/projects_archives/ (last visited Apr. 
26, 2016). 
 144 See Privacy Multistakeholder Process: Mobile Application Transparency, 
NAT’L. TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 12, 2013), 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2013/privacy-multistakeholder-
process-mobile-application-transparency. 
 145 Pub L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, enacted November 12, 1999. 
 146  Because of the broad scope of GLBA, eight federal agencies were 
responsible for developing compliance standards and subsequently enforcing 
GLBA. They are: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, Office of the Controller of the Currency, Office of Thrift 
Supervision, the FDIC, the SEC, and National Credit Union Administration and 
the FTC. 
 147 See Get Noticed: Effective Financial Privacy Notices, FED. TRADE COMM’N. 
(Dec. 4, 2001), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
public_events/interagency-public-workshop-get-noticed-effective-financial-
privacy-notices/glbtranscripts.pdf. 
 148 Pub. L. 109-351, October 13, 2006. 
 149 See Final Model Privacy Form Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act - 16 CFR 
Part 313, FED. TRADE COMM’N. (Dec. 1, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/policy/ federal-
register-notices/final-model-privacy-form-under-gramm-leach-bliley-act-16-cfr-part. 
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Register on December 1, 2009,150 specified the content and format 
for institutions choosing to adopt the standardized GLBA notice.151 
Also in 2001, the Centre for Information Policy Leadership at 
the law firm of Hunton and Williams LLP undertook a project to 
develop a multi-layered online privacy notice that would 
complement an organization’s existing “long” privacy notice.152 The 
goal of the project was to provide a standard, simplified format that 
would promote better consumer decisions about whether or not to 
share personal information with a particular organization.153  The 
simplified format was expected to communicate effectively with 
individuals about how an organization collects, uses, shares, and 
protects personal information; individuals wishing more detail about 
the organization’s practices could also consult the long notice.154 In 
November 2004, the EU Article 29 Working Party155 endorsed the 
                                                
 150 For a copy of the final rule, see FEDERAL REGISTER, FINAL MODEL PRIVACY 
FORM UNDER THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT; FINAL RULE (2001), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/federal_register_notices/final-
model-privacy-form-under-gramm-leach-bliley-act-16-cfr-part-
313/091201gramm-leach.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2015). 
 151  See FED. TRADE COMM’N., PRIVACY MODEL FORM, 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/rules/privacy-consumer-financial-
information-financial-privacy-rule/privacymodelform_optout.pdf (last visited 
April 18, 2016). The model form consists of two pages and is formatted as a table 
with sections for information collection and use, information sharing, how to opt 
out of information sharing (if relevant), definitions of affiliates and joint of 
marketing, and other information the institution wishes to provide. 
 152  Ten Steps to Develop a Multilayered Privacy Notice, CENTRE FOR 
INFORMATION POLICY LEADERSHIP (Feb. 2006), available at  
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/wp-content/files/2012/07/Centre-10-Steps-
to-Multilayered-Privacy-Notice.pdf. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/index_en.htm (last visited 
Apr. 26, 2016). 
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concept of a multi-layered notice. 156  At least two organizations 
currently use the layered notice.157 
A third effort to improve written notices began in summer 2012 
when the NTIA launched a multi-stakeholder process to address 
how to provide notices for mobile apps. 158  The White House 
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights called for the use of a multi-
stakeholder process to develop voluntary, enforceable codes of 
conduct to address privacy questions raised by new technologies and 
specific data practices; this was the first such process.159 The multi-
stakeholder group agreed to limit the scope of its work to developing 
a code of conduct for a short form notice for mobile devices.160 On 
                                                
 156 The EU recommendation called for two layers in addition to the long notice. 
Layer 1 of the short notice was to include the identity and contact details for the 
data controller, and the purpose for processing. Layer 1 was to be used when space 
was very limited. Layer 2 of the condensed notice was to provide six items in less 
than a page with subheadings: scope, personal information collected, uses and 
sharing, choices (including any access options), important information, and 
contact information. The content of the “important information” section, as well 
as the wording and format of the condensed notice, was left to the organization. 
See Opinion 10/2004 on More Harmonised Information Provisions, ARTICLE 29 
DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY (Nov. 25, 2004), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2004/wp100_en.pdf. 
 157  See, e.g., Privacy Policy Highlights, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE (2016), 
http://about.usps.com/who-we-are/privacy-policy/privacy-policy-highlights.htm; 
P&G Privacy Notice, PROCTER & GAMBLE (2016), http://www.pg.com/privacy/ 
english/privacy_notice.shtml. 
 158 See First Privacy Multistakeholder Meeting, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE: 
NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMINISTRATION (July 12, 2012), 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2012/first-privacy-multistakeholder-
meeting-july-12-2012. 
 159 Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for Protecting 
Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy, THE WHITE 
HOUSE (Feb. 23, 2012), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/privacy-final.pdf. For more information about the multi-stakeholder 
process itself, see Privacy Multistakeholder Process: Mobile Application 
Transparency, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE: NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. 
ADMINISTRATION (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-
publication/2013/privacy-multistakeholder-process-mobile-application-transparency. 
 160 See Privacy Multistakeholder Meeting: Mobile Application Transparency, 
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE: NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMINISTRATION (Oct. 
16, 2012), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/10162012_ 
agenda_revised.pdf. 
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July 25, 2013, the Department of Commerce released a draft of the 
code, which specified the data categories to be included in the 
notice. 161  It also required adopters to describe the types of data 
collected, how user-specific data is shared, where an individual can 
access a long form privacy notice if one exists, and the identity of 
the entity providing the app. The draft code includes design 
guidelines for the notice.162 The multi-stakeholder group has not 
been active since the draft code was issued in 2013.163 
The GLB model form was subjected to quantitative consumer 
testing, which assessed the performance of the final notice.164 While 
focus groups were used in the design of the CIPL layered notice, 
neither the CIPL notice nor the NTIA notice for mobile applications 
were subject to quantitative performance testing.165 
Carnegie Mellon researchers tested the mobile applications 
notice generated by the NTIA process. They found that many users 
                                                
 161 See Short Form Notice Code of Conduct to Promote Transparency in Mobile 
App Practices, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE: NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. 
ADMINISTRATION (July 25, 2013), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/ 
publications/july_25_code_draft.pdf. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Privacy Multistakeholder Meeting, supra note 160. 
 164 See Alan Levy & Manoj Hastak, Consumer Comprehension of Financial 
Privacy Notices (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/ 
privacyinitiatives/Levy-Hastak-Report.pdf (describing how the GLB model form 
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 165  Typically, two types of research inform the design of new disclosures. 
Qualitative research (e.g. focus groups) is used to design initial prototypes. 
Quantitative research is used to test prototypes to see which performs best in 
meeting the objectives of the new disclosure. Quantitative testing is important 
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qualitative and quantitative research to design the GLB model form. In the 
quantitative research, the researchers engaged by the FTC tested three alternative 
notices using a sample of 1032 individuals from five different geographical areas. 
The testing assessed the alternatives on their ability to help consumers (a) 
compare across banks based on the banks’ information practices, (b) evaluate 
available “opt-out” choices, and (c) make informed choices across banks. See id.; 
see also Alan S. Levy, Sara B. Fein & Raymond E. Schucker, Performance 
Characteristics of Seven Nutrition Label Formats, 15 J. PUB. POL’Y & 
MARKETING 1, 1–15 (1996). 
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had limited understanding of the terms used in the NITA notice.166 
In another study, Carnegie Mellon researchers tested traditional 
privacy notices and layered notices.167 They found that consumers 
processed information articulated in layered notices faster than that 
found in long notices, but that readers of the layered notices came 
away with a less accurate sense of an organization’s data and privacy 
practices.168 They also found that people did not choose to continue 
to read the long notice when they did not find the information they 
sought in the short notice.169 This suggests that testing should be an 
integral part of the design of alternative notices if the alternatives 
are to be useful. 
B. Alternatives to Traditional Notice 
This section describes three efforts to develop alternatives to 
traditional privacy notices. The Platform for Privacy Preferences 
(“P3P”) represents the most ambitious attempt to date to use 
technology to improve online disclosures. The AdChoices “icon” 
provides a way to provide better visibility for online behavioral 
advertising. Finally, some organizations have independently begun 
to develop tools to help inform their users. 
1. The Platform for Privacy Preferences 
P3P is a standard developed by the World Wide Web 
Consortium (“W3C”) through a multi-year process that began in 
1997.170 A final Last Call specification was issued in September 
                                                
 166 See Rebecca Balebako, Richard Shay & Lorrie Faith Cranor, Is Your Inseam 
a Biometric? A Case Study on the Role of Usability Studies in Developing Public 
Policy, (Feb. 2014), available at http://lorrie.cranor.org/pubs/usec14-inseam.pdf. 
 167 See generally Alecia M. McDonald et. al., A Comparative Study of Online 
Privacy Policies and Formats, in PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES: 9TH 
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM, PETS 2009, SEATTLE, WA, USA, AUGUST 5–7, 
2009. PROCEEDINGS 37–55 (Ian Goldberg & Mikhail J. Atallah eds., 2009). 
 168 See id. 
 169 See id. 
 170  LORRIE FAITH CRANOR, WEB PRIVACY WITH P3P 46 (O’Reilly & 
Associates, eds., 2002) (Chapter 4 describes the history of P3P). 
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2001.171 Adoption of P3P was voluntary.172 P3P provides a syntax 
with which websites can code the privacy practices described in 
their traditional privacy notice.173 Using a standard XML format, the 
notice can be retrieved automatically and interpreted easily by user 
agents such as browsers or other applications.174 These user agents 
allow online users to learn about the information practices of the 
sites they visit without needing to read the written privacy notice.175 
Many perceived P3P as too difficult and complicated to use, and 
it never was widely implemented.176 Microsoft was the only major 
browser to support P3P; Internet Explorer 6 (“IE6”) used P3P to 
implement cookie filtering.177 Using a slider, individuals set their 
privacy preferences in IE6 along a spectrum ranging from high to 
low. If IE6 found a P3P policy, it evaluated the website’s privacy 
practices as described in its P3P policy and decided, based on the set 
preference, which cookies were acceptable. IE6 could, for example, 
accept a cookie, accept a cookie but downgrade it to a session 
cookie, or suppress or reject a cookie entirely. 
                                                
 171 See generally id. For a copy of the most recent P3P specification and other 
documents related to the development of P3P, see Lorie Cranor & Rigo Wenning, 
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) Project: Enabling smarter Privacy Tools 
for the Web, W3: PLATFORM FOR PRIVACY PREFERENCES INITIATIVE, available at 
http://www.w3.org/P3P/ (last updated Nov. 20, 2007). 
 172 See Cranor, supra note 170, at 55. 
 173 See Cranor & Wenning, supra note 171. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 An internal Citibank white paper argued that implementing P3P could also 
limit a company in terms of the commerce, cross-selling, and marketing 
information collected online. The authors state that the paper it is simply a 
statement of the opinion of two Citibank employees and does not represent the 
official position of Citibank. See generally Kenneth Lee and Gabriel Speyer, 
White paper: Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) & Citibank, CITIBANK 
ADVANCED DEV. GRP. (Oct. 22, 1998), available at 
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 177  Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) (Windows CE 5.0) contains a 
description of Microsoft’s implementation of P3P for cookie filtering. Platform 
for Privacy Preferences (P3P) (Windows CE 5.0), MICROSOFT 
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms905230.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 
2016). 
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Two standalone applications also implemented P3P: Privacy 
Bird and Privacy Finder.178 Privacy Bird automatically searches for 
P3P privacy policies at every website a user visits.179 The Privacy 
Bird software asks the user to describe their privacy concerns; it then 
communicates to the user whether a visited site’s policies match 
their stated privacy preferences.180 The software displays a green 
bird icon at websites that match, and a red bird icon at sites that do 
not.181 If the software cannot find or fetch a P3P policy from the 
visited website, the Privacy Bird displays a yellow icon.182 
Privacy Finder is a privacy-enhanced search engine that delivers 
search results based on websites’ computer-readable privacy 
policies.183 A privacy meter with green boxes indicates how closely 
the website’s privacy policy matches a list of preset privacy 
preferences. If no privacy meter is displayed, it means that a valid 
P3P policy could not be located for a given website.184 
2. AdChoices Icon 
The research projects described above were early attempts to 
better inform the individual in an environment where website 
content was provided by a single source, typically the site owner. 
Today, a web page is likely to be supported by many vendors and 
comprise content from many different sources, each of which may 
follow different information practices. In February 2009, the FTC 
issued a staff report articulating self-regulatory principles that 
applied to online advertising where ads were targeted based on 
                                                
 178 PRIVACY BIRD, http://www.privacybird.org/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2016); 
PRIVACY FINDER, http://www.privacyfinder.org/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2016). 
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tracking individuals over time. 185  The principles excluded 
contextual advertising where an ad was based on a single visit to a 
web page or a single search request and “first party” advertising 
where data was not shared with third parties. 
In response to the FTC report, the online advertising industry 
formed the Digital Advertising Alliance (“DAA”) – an alliance to 
promote implementation of the FTC principles and to create a 
clickable icon, which would appear on online ads.186 The AdChoices 
Icon represents an attempt to provide greater awareness in an 
environment where networks of online advertisers track browsing 
behavior across websites.187 
Stakeholders hoped that over time, the icon would become as 
recognizable to consumers as the recycling symbol.188 Currently, the 
program applies to online behavioral advertising for both the 
desktop and mobile environments and includes a webpage that 
individuals can visit to opt out of receiving advertising that has been 
targeted based on their browsing behavior.189 
                                                
 185  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Self-Regulatory Principles For Online 
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YAHOO, https://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/relevantads.html (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2016). 
 188 Stephanie Clifford, A Little ‘I’ to Teach about Online Privacy, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 26, 2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/business/media/ 
27adco.html?&_r=0. 
 189  The AboutAds consumer choice page is available online. DIGITAL 
ADVERTISING ALLIANCE CONSUMER CHOICE PAGE, 
http://www.aboutads.info/choices/ (last visited April 14, 2016). 
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The DAA program appears to have been widely adopted; 
however researchers found instances of non-compliance.190 Further, 
the effectiveness of the program has not been extensively assessed, 
and there is no indication that usability testing was conducted as part 
of the AdChoices design process.191 Researchers at Carnegie Mellon 
University independently assessed Internet users’ perceptions of 
disclosures about online behavioral advertising.192 Drawing on prior 
research, they tested icons, taglines, and landing pages and found 
that all fell short in terms of notifying study participants about online 
behavioral advertising and clearly informing them about their 
choices.193 
3. Company-generated Tools 
Organizations have taken independent steps to create tools by 
which consumers can view and control their personal information. 
For example, the Google privacy policy includes a section on 
“Transparency and Choice,” which describes tools generated by 
Google that allow users to access their account history, view and 
edit their preferences about the Google ads they receive, and control 
who people share their information with through their Google 
Account.194 Acxiom, a large data broker, offers “About the Data,” a 
tool to help consumers learn about the data Acxiom has collected 
about them.195 
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 193 Id. Specific findings included 1) notices are not noticed, 2) “AdChoices” is 
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 194  Welcome to Google Privacy Policy, GOOGLE PRIVACY AND TERMS, 
https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/?fg=1 (last visited April 14, 2016). 
 195  ABOUTTHEDATA.COM, https://www.aboutthedata.com/ (last visited April 
14, 2016). 
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C. Lessons Learned and Unresolved Challenges 
While it is widely acknowledged that most traditional privacy 
notices are too long, lack uniformity, and are difficult to 
comprehend, notice is still viewed as the primary means whereby 
organizations make the public aware of their data practices.196 The 
efforts to improve notices described above yielded mixed results. 
For example, only two of these efforts, the AdChoices icon and the 
GLB model form, were widely adopted. 197  Nonetheless, these 
efforts, particularly the GLB model form, provide useful insights 
about what enhances or inhibits the ability to provide more effective 
notices. 
1. Lessons of the GLB Model Form 
Legislation and implementing rules offer organizations 
incentives to adopt the GLB model form. GLBA requires that 
covered organizations disseminate privacy notices that meet criteria 
established in the law’s disclosure requirements and the privacy rule 
implementing the law.198 While the use of the model privacy form is 
voluntary, organizations that do so benefit from certainty that they 
satisfy these criteria. Moreover, the standardized format and content 
of the model form creates efficiencies for consumers by better 
                                                
 196 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF 
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Campaign, 4A’s (Jan. 20, 2012) http://www.aaaa.org/news/press/Pages/ 
012012_daa_adchoices.aspx. 
 198 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106–
102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). 
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enabling choice about information use (to the extent available under 
the law) and allowing consumers to compare choices across 
financial institutions. Finally, the notice as articulated in the model 
form continues to provide a basis for FTC regulation. 
Moreover, because the GLBA implementing rule does not 
provide the assurances of a safe harbor,199 some companies perceive 
that posting a notice in a way other than that prescribed by the model 
form increases their risk of exposure to an FTC enforcement action. 
The model’s clear rules for content and format arguably lessen that 
exposure. Finally, rigorous consumer testing increased the 
probability that the form would be effective. 
In 2013, researchers at Carnegie Mellon University assessed 
over 3,000 GLBA policies based on data collected using an 
automated web crawler.200 The study highlighted the challenges that 
organizations using the form face when disclosing what types of 
information they collect.201 Restrictions on what language may be 
used to describe how information is collected also posed 
problems.202 While standardized language facilitated transparency 
and comparisons across institutions, the researchers found some of 
the terms used were redundant or ambiguous.203 However, when 
researchers compared privacy practices across similar institutions, 
they found differences in their privacy practices, suggesting that 
making a company’s data practices more conspicuous could 
empower consumers’ decision-making. 204  The standardized table 
format used in the GLB model form thus appears to hold promise 
for a better way to deliver necessary information about data and 
privacy practices to individuals. 
                                                
 199  The implementing rule originally provided safe harbor protection for 
organizations using the model form. The final rule eliminated the safe harbor. 
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2. Promise and Challenges of a “Nutrition Label” Format for 
Privacy Notices 
The CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Lab (“CUPS Lab”)205 
at Carnegie Mellon University researches, develops, and tests 
alternatives to traditional privacy notices. 206  In a recent study, 
researchers tested four alternative forms of privacy notices, 
comparing them to natural language, full-text policies. 207  They 
found that of the five options, the standardized table yielded the best 
results.208 They concluded that the success of this approach resulted 
from both the table format and the standardized language.209 Both 
the format and the language improved accuracy, the ability to locate 
information, the speed with which an individual could locate 
information, and the individual’s experience in reading notices.210 
These findings argued for developing a format for short privacy 
notices similar to nutritional labels.211 
Despite their promise, developing a privacy notice modeled after 
food nutrition labels poses significant challenges. The nutrition 
content of food can be analyzed and quantified, and the numerical 
values posted on the labels can be objectively tested and verified by 
a third party. The result is a set of reliable numbers the consumer 
can compare easily. A consumer interested in purchasing, for 
example, a loaf of bread can quickly compare several brands based 
                                                
 205  CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory, CARNEGIE MELLON 
CYLAB., http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/. 
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on calories per serving and cholesterol, vitamin, fat, and fiber 
content. In the United States, they can also use the label to compare 
products against numerically expressed government nutrition 
recommendations. These values are unlikely to change quickly, and 
if they do, their accuracy can be readily tested in a lab. Creating an 
accurate nutritional label involves simply filling in the boxes on the 
form. As a result, the nutrition label has been at least moderately 
effective at promoting consumer choice, creating a basis for 
regulation, and providing a source of information for consumer 
advocates and the media.212 
While the effectiveness of both nutrition labels and privacy 
notices depends on consumers’ ability to understand the information 
disclosed in the notice, privacy notices pose challenges not faced by 
entities adopting the nutrition label format. First, data practices and 
protections do not lend themselves to quantified expression. For 
example, while nutrition labels are based on “percent of 
Recommended Daily Allowance,” there is no comparable standard 
for information practices given the variety of business models and 
industries. Moreover, for food, the product is fixed at purchase and 
the individual controls its use after purchase. For information, the 
individual currently has little comparable control as the company 
controls future uses of the data. All future uses are unlikely to be 
known at the time of disclosure and may be subject to change. This, 
and the fact that personal information touches many entities within 
an organization, challenges attempts to accurately describe the 
organization’s data practices. 
C. Looking Ahead 
In its 2012 report, FTC proposed that to promote better 
comprehension and comparison of privacy practices, notices should 
be “clearer, shorter, and more standardized.”213 It recognized that a 
rigid format for use across all sectors is not appropriate, and that it 
would be necessary to accommodate differences in business models 
                                                
 212 See ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: 
THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY (2007) at 84–85. See also SUSAN 
G. HADDEN, READ THE LABEL (1986) at 145-151. 
 213 Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, supra note 41, at 
61. 
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across industry sectors. 214  It stated that to allow individuals to 
compare privacy practices across companies and encourage 
companies to compete on privacy, privacy notices should contain 
some standardized elements such as terminology and format.215 How 
this would work in practice remains an open question. Further, the 
time required by efforts aimed at improving notices described 
previously suggest that creating new forms of effective notice is a 
long-term project and that these efforts are unlikely to be successful 
unless consumer testing is part of the design process. New 
technologies such as mobile applications and the “Internet of 
Things” pose further challenges to notice. 
VI.  EMERGING TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 
The prior sections focused primarily on issues related to 
providing notice in traditional computing on desktops and laptops. 
This Section reviews the challenges raised by new technologies and 
data ecosystems, which may provide little opportunity to interface 
with the consumer. This limited opportunity for interaction with the 
consumer makes providing notice difficult and sometimes 
impossible. 
The broad implementation of notices starting in the 1990’s 
began in a data environment that centered primarily on the collection 
of data via websites.216 Privacy protections were based on a theory 
of control – individuals who were made aware of data practices and 
protection measures and provided the opportunity to choose based 
on assertions in a posted privacy policy could make decisions about 
the collection and use and sharing of data pertaining to them.217 
Increasingly, individuals will navigate spaces throughout which 
data is collected, shared, and processed silently and ubiquitously—
and for a wide variety of purposes. Sensors will be embedded in 
rooms and across spaces to facilitate such functions as climate 
control, physical security, employee and equipment tracking, and 
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 216 See Hoofnagle, supra note 5, at 147. 
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energy distribution. 218  Sensors will also be deployed across 
geographically distributed systems to manage, for example, 
resource delivery, supply chain management, and traffic control.219 
It is not clear how individuals could be provided real time notice in 
such environments, whether and to what extent individuals should 
be provided with an opportunity to consent, and if so, how it could 
be granted or withheld. 
The advent of big data and new technologies such as mobile 
applications the Internet of Things, and sensor-rich environments 
pose new privacy concerns and new challenges for addressing these 
concerns. Privacy concerns arise when information practices 
conflict with an individual’s reasonable expectations about how 
their information should be used.220 The physical characteristics of 
these new technologies may make it difficult to make these new uses 
visible to the individual, and these issues are exacerbated in a global 
environment with varying literacy issues. 
A. Big Data Analytics 
Using analytics to process what is commonly referred to as “big 
data”—very large data sets, rapidly gathered and compiled from 
diverse sources—raises its own challenges. Analytics are often 
applied to data originally collected for another purpose and 
combined with data from other sources.221 The individual may be 
aware of the initial collection and uses of data, but not of the 
                                                
 218 See generally Michael Chui, Markus Löffler, & Roger Roberts, The Internet 
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subsequent analytic processing.222 Further, the information may also 
be shared with and used by third parties of whom the individual is 
not aware.223 There are also calls for increased transparency around 
algorithms when these are applied using analytics to make 
automated decisions.224 
Perhaps the aspect of big data analytics that poses the greatest 
challenge is the nature of the processing itself. Researchers do not 
approach large data sets in search of the answer to a question; rather, 
they explore the data for what it may reveal.225 What results is the 
use of data in ways that could not have been anticipated and 
therefore, would not have been included in a privacy notice.226 
Providing effective notice later, when these new uses actually 
occur, is not practical—data may have been collected long before its 
use and amassed from many different sources, and it may no longer 
be possible to locate and contact what could be thousands of 
individuals whose data was used. Further, when big data analytics 
are used to create personal information from non-personal 
information after collection, this poses additional challenges. 227 
Absent new restrictions on data collection and use, proposals for 
addressing some of the privacy and other fairness challenges of 
secondary use of big data include companies’ implementation of 
privacy impact assessments, privacy-by-design processes, 
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accountability programs, and ethical reviews to avoid undertaking 
legal but questionable data uses.228 
B. Mobile Application 
Mobile applications also pose challenges to transparency that do 
not exist with applications that run on a traditional PC. First, the 
small screens on mobile devices provide limited space to display a 
traditional privacy notice. The NTIA multi-stakeholder process 
described previously 229  attempted to address this challenge by 
proposing a short form notice that only addressed privacy issues 
related to information considered sensitive.230 Second, applications 
can access information on the user’s phone such as contacts, photos, 
or actual location, even when that information is not necessary for 
the application to function or may be generated by another function 
on the device, such as the use of an individual’s location by a 
flashlight application.231 Users may be unaware of these information 
practices if they are not disclosed to the user or potential user of the 
application. 232  Without awareness, it may be impossible for 
individuals to make informed choices about using a particular 
application. 233  Finally, the constraints of the application 
environment raise questions about how and when notice should be 
                                                
 228 See Ryan Calo, Consumer Subject Review Boards: A Thought Experiment 
(Sep. 2013), in BIG DATA & PRIVACY: MAKING ENDS MEET DIGEST, 
http://www.futureofprivacy.org/big-data-privacy-workshop-paper-collection. 
The White House Discussion Draft: Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights of February 
27, 2015 also calls for privacy review boards. Some have suggested that 
companies could provide transparency if they made the results of their internal 
privacy reviews public. However, making such reviews public could result in 
sanitized reports that don’t serve their intended purpose. 
 229 Privacy Multistakeholder Meeting, supra note 160.  
 230 Id. 
 231  See, e.g., Android Flashlight App Developer Settles FTC Charges It 
Deceived Consumers, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 5, 2013), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/12/android-flashlight-app-
developer-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived. 
 232 Id. 
 233 See, e.g., Rebecca Balebako et. al., “Little Brothers Watching You:” Raising 
Awareness of Data Leaks on Smartphones, SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY (SOUPS) (July 2013) https://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/ 
2013/proceedings/a12_Balebako.pdf. 
MAY 2016] From Privacy Notices to Effective Transparency 565 
provided, where the notice should be stored, and when it should be 
displayed. 
C. Internet of Things and Sensors 
The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to the ability of everyday 
objects to connect to the Internet and to send and receive data.234 
This can include automobiles, home appliances, or wearable fitness 
devices among other “smart devices.”235 Mobile devices with WI-FI 
or Bluetooth turned on enable sensors in physical places to receive 
signals from nearby devices. For example, sensors in retail stores 
can use a unique identifier broadcast by the mobile device to track 
how customers move through the store; often a third-party analytics 
firm may do this tracking without the customer’s knowledge.236 As 
is the case with mobile applications, individuals are unlikely to be 
aware of the information capabilities of these devices or the fact 
their device is being tracked, highlighting the need for awareness at 
the time the individual makes a purchase decision about a device or 
chooses to enable a particular feature. Further, because many of 
these devices may not contain a screen, let alone a small screen, they 
pose even greater transparency challenges than mobile applications 
and big data analytics. As a result, new and creative approaches to 
disclosure are needed including decoupling the notice from the 
actual device.237 For example, in its 2015 Staff Report on the Internet 
of Things, the FTC suggested some alternatives to traditional web 
privacy notices for the IoT such as QR codes, choices at the point of 
sale, or choices during setup of the device.238 
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VIII.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Until recently, the term “organizational transparency” primarily 
was used as a rhetorical device or as an ad hoc construct, the 
meaning of which varied by field of study. 239  For example, the 
meaning of transparency differed depending upon whether one 
referred to, for example, financial markets, organizational 
governance or trust in online commerce.240 In their recent review of 
the literature on transparency, Schnackenberg and Tomlinson define 
transparency as a perception of the quality of information received 
from a sender which includes three dimensions of information 
quality: the degree of information disclosure (including the 
perception that relevant information is received in a timely fashion), 
the clarity of the disclosure, and the accuracy of the disclosure.241 
Schnackenberg and Tomlinson further argue that transparency 
is a mechanism to increase trust in organizations, because 
information quality can enhance perceptions that an organization is 
trustworthy. 242  Other research has shown that consumers are 
generally willing to disclose their personal information if the 
benefits of disclosure exceed the perceived risks.243 Trust affects 
consumers’ willingness to assume the risks of disclosing personal 
information; it is important over the life of a customer relationship 
where consumers must rely on “strangers” to protect their interests 
due to information asymmetries.244 Organizations can help create 
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trust if they provide assurances that they will not behave 
opportunistically. Therefore, good quality disclosures can signal to 
individuals that a company can be trusted with their personal 
information, providing the company abides by the practices 
disclosed in the notice.245 
By understanding the dimensions of transparency, organizations 
can better improve the quality of their disclosures to stakeholders, 
meet regulatory and self-regulatory requirements, and contribute to 
fair data use. This work informs this Article’s recommendations for 
moving beyond the current reliance on notices to a more robust 
approach to transparency.246 
Notice as a general concept will continue to be the starting point 
for transparency. However, given the growing complexity of the 
emerging data eco-system, the ubiquity of data collection, and the 
incidence of real-time processing, a single notice can no longer 
reasonably be expected to serve the many purposes of supporting 
individual choice, regulation, and public awareness and education. 
This Article proposes instead that to achieve an environment of 
transparency, organizations should deploy, and policy makers 
should support a variety of methods for reaching all stakeholders.247 
In particular, the perceived quality of consumer disclosures should 
be improved along the three dimensions of transparency: degree of 
disclosure, clarity, and accuracy. We now turn to our specific 
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recommendations for improving transparency including the need for 
business buy-in and regulatory guidance. 
A. Organizations should continue to provide comprehensive, 
technical notices to facilitate the roles of regulators and 
advocates. 
Long notices often read like legal documents and include 
comprehensive technical descriptions of data collection and use, 
technologies, and complex networks of business partners and 
vendors. Such notices often are of little use to individuals, who are 
unwilling and uninterested in investing the time to read them, and 
are often ill equipped to understand them. In spite of these familiar 
shortcomings, these notices are still important and necessary to 
transparency, as they provide a basis for oversight by regulators who 
can use them to compare assertions about data protection against 
actual practices. Comprehensive privacy notices also provide 
knowledgeable experts and privacy advocates with the information 
necessary to raise important societal questions about surveillance, 
appropriate and inappropriate uses of data and the evolution of 
technology. These notices ensure that the advances in technology 
and data processing benefit from the oversight that can support 
consumer protection and keep organizations accountable. However, 
these notices lack the clarity and accuracy needed by individuals and 
therefore, fail to provide transparency to an important group of 
stakeholders.248 
                                                
 248 Id. Research has shown notice to play a role in building consumer trust and 
promoting disclosure. For example, comprehension of online notices was found 
to be positively related to both reading notices and trusting the notice. Conversely, 
notices perceived by consumers to be obfuscated or excessively legalistic 
contribute to skepticism. Trust in online notices has also been positively related 
to lower levels of privacy concern.; see also Results of Consumer Data Privacy 
Survey Reveal Critical Need for All Digital Citizens to Participate in Data 
Privacy Day, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 28, 2015) http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/results-of-consumer-data-privacy-survey-reveal-critical-need-for-all-
digital-citizens-to-participate-in-data-privacy-day-300026888.html. A 2014 
survey by the National Cyber Security Alliance found that 83% of respondents 
cited using only trusted websites and companies as a strategy to protect their 
privacy; this was the second most used strategy after having a strong password. 
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B. Organizations should also develop alternative forms of 
disclosure for individuals, providing them with relevant 
information in clear, understandable language, in a format that 
promotes comprehension and that is delivered at the 
appropriate time. 
Comprehensive notices do not support transparency for 
individuals because they are perceived as being unclear, and they 
may not be available at the appropriate time. Further, they may be 
too general to provide an accurate picture of the organization’s 
information practices.249 In a recent study, Martin argues that the 
“designed obscurity” of privacy notices achieved through the use of 
ambiguous language sends a false signal to individuals and may 
undercut the ability of notices to support market decisions based on 
differences in information practices. 250  Therefore, alternative 
disclosures are needed that are brief, succinct, and accurate yet 
include the relevant information that promotes individual 
understanding about data collection and use. In some environments, 
these disclosures will simply communicate pertinent information. In 
others, the disclosure should be designed and delivered at a time to 
facilitate rational choice when choice is available, such as whether 
or not to allow a mobile application to make use of the individual’s 
exact location. 
To create these disclosures, organizations will need to need 
understand how to communicate effectively with their target 
audiences. Consumer disclosures should include only the 
information that is most relevant and meaningful to a specific 
audience at a particular time. They should also disclose appropriate 
information about how data is used at a particular point in time. In 
                                                
 249 See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the 
Notice and Choice Framework, (TPRC, 42nd Research Conference on 
Communication, Information, and Internet Policy 2014). For example, 
Reidenberg and his colleagues argue that broad or vague statements about 
collection practices are the functional equivalent of an absence of notice. 
Incomplete notice results when information collection occurs outside the scope of 
the firm’s notice. 
 250  See Kirsten Martin, Privacy Notices as Tabula Rasa: An Empirical 
Investigation into how Complying with a Privacy Notice is Related to Meeting 
Privacy Expectations Online, 34 J. OF PUB. POL. AND MKTG. 210, 210 (2015). 
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some cases, they should alert the individual about the specific data 
practice, particularly if the practice is unexpected as is the case with 
newer technologies described previously. 251  Firms will need to 
understand what information individuals need and develop methods 
for communicating this information quickly and clearly. In 
particular, it is necessary to understand how to effectively 
communicate information in specific situations, and how people 
process this information. 252  Solutions can include layered text 
notices and alternatives to text. One such example are “visceral 
notices,” which include auditory or visual prompts embedded in a 
particular technology and activated at the appropriate moment while 
the individual is using the product to alert the individual that the 
product is collecting personal information.253 Existing research on 
labels and warnings may also prove instructive here. 254 
It will also be important to develop ways to make the notice 
clearly available and easily located at the time of decision-making 
or “just-in-time.” This is particularly true for new technologies with 
small screens or no screens at all, or for situations where multiple 
parties are involved in collecting or delivering information. For 
example, many mobile applications now offer notice the first time 
the application attempts to collect sensitive information, or to use 
information in a way that is unexpected. For some technologies, an 
“it takes a village” approach may be appropriate where 
responsibility for delivering notice is shared among business 
partners. For example, for mobile applications, initial notice may be 
provided by an application store so the user can review an 
application’s information practice before they decide to download 
                                                
 251  Florian Schaub et. al., A Design Space for Effective Privacy Notices, 
Symposium, Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2015), Carnegie Mellon 
University (2015) http://ra.adm.cs.cmu.edu/anon/isr2015/CMU-ISR-15-105.pdf. 
 252 See, e.g., Michael S. Wogalter et al., supra note 247. 
 253  See generally Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (And 
Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027 (2012). 
 254 For more information on label and warning research, see generally George 
R. Milne & Mary J. Culnan, Strategies for Reducing Online Privacy Risks: Why 
Consumers Read (or Don’t Read) Online Privacy Notices, 18 JOURNAL OF 
INTERACTIVE MARKETING 2, 15–29 (2004). See also Privacy Nutrition Labels, 
CYLAB USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY LABORATORY (last visited Apr. 5, 2016) 
https://cups.cs.cmu.edu/privacyLabel/. 
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it. This approach may also be appropriate for behavioral advertising, 
data brokers, and the collection of information from sensors 
operated by third parties where the individual is unaware of the firm 
collecting their information and does not have a relationship with 
it. 255  The Internet of Things, in particular, will require creative 
approaches to notice, particularly where devices may not have a 
screen and where collection of information is unexpected or not 
obvious or visible.256 
C.  Notices should be developed as part of privacy-by-design 
Because privacy notices have served an integral role in 
regulation (see Section II above), legal counsel has usually been 
tasked with drafting notices independent of the development of the 
applications described in the notice. Based on an inventory of the 
kind and method of data collection, the nature of the data use, and 
the security measures implemented, lawyers have written notices 
that are comprehensive and designed to avoid liability. Importantly, 
because notices are often viewed as a vehicle for compliance, they 
largely have been drafted at the end of the system development 
process, after decisions about data practices have been implemented. 
The drafting and posting of the notice has often been one of the final 
steps an organization takes before rolling out a technology or data 
driven service. In some cases, organizations have side-stepped the 
review of their data practices as part of their drafting process and 
have looked instead to boiler-plate notice language as their starting 
point. 257  Given this disconnect, the rapid development cycles in 
                                                
 255 An example is where retail or other locations contract with an analytics firm, 
who use sensors to perform mobile tracking for the retailer. A retailer who has 
contracted with the analytics firm and who has direct contact with the consumer 
bears major responsibility for notifying their customers about the tracking. 
 256 The FTC called for innovation in notices in its 2014 report on the Internet of 
Things. 
 257 When privacy notices are viewed as a compliance responsibility, overseen 
by the legal department, the rapid pace of system development makes it difficult 
to coordinate the privacy notice with new features of the application. 
Representatives of tech companies made this point during the discussion of this 
Article at the 2015 Privacy Law Scholars Conference (PLSC). PLSC operates 
under Chatham House Rules so comments cannot be attributed to a specific 
individual. 
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many firms increases the likelihood that their privacy notice will not 
reflect the details of current data practices. 
Over the past several years, some companies have adopted an 
approach to privacy governance that involves looking at and 
implementing privacy considerations throughout the entire design 
and development process.258 Developers, legal staff, and compliance 
officers at various points in the development cycle question the 
collection, use, sharing, and protection for data, asking question 
like: What data are we collecting? Is all of this data necessary? What 
measures are we employing to secure the data? With whom do we 
plan to share it, and why? Can we offer the individual the 
opportunity to consent or exercise choice about the use of his or her 
data? If so, how can we build that into the user experience? 
While privacy-by-design increasingly is considered 
fundamental to responsible governance within organizations, it has 
focused almost exclusively on data practices, often as they are 
implemented in technology. Yet privacy-by-design also offers an 
opportunity to build and improve transparency. It allows 
organizations the chance to create notices that are suited to the 
particular service or device. Rather than add them on at the end, 
privacy notices can be integrated into the design of the system. 
Doing so could result in notices that are more relevant, communicate 
better to individual users, and become part of the user’s interaction 
with the device or system. Designers, supported by compliance, 
legal, and appropriate personnel, can take advantage of these 
support opportunities and overcome the constraints of the system 
when designing notice. They can identify points in the system where 
the most useful, appropriate information can be conveyed to the 
user. Since the time at which a user encounters a notice can affect 
how effective the notice is, developing the notice throughout the 
design process can allow designers to provide users notice and 
information at different times depending on context. It can allow for 
delivery of visual or auditory notices, depending on the device or 
                                                
 258 This process is referred to as privacy-by-design, an approach to protecting 
privacy by embedding it into the design specifications of technologies, business 
practices, and physical infrastructures. See Introduction to PbD, Information and 
Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (last visited Apr. 5, 2016) 
https://www.ipc.on.ca/english/privacy/introduction-to-pbd/. 
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data environment. It can also allow developers to take advantage of 
a variety of channels by which notices can be delivered, depending 
on the audience, and the constraints and opportunities of the 
system.259 
D.  Contextual expectations should serve as a key consideration 
for improving consumer notices. 
Individual privacy expectations have been defined in terms of 
social norms within a particular context. These norms define what 
information practices are acceptable and do not raise privacy 
concerns in a given context. A recent national public opinion survey 
found that eighty-seven percent of individuals were concerned about 
the sharing of their information with others without their knowledge 
and consent, suggesting this practice violates social norms. 260 
Reusing information in a way that is related to the original purpose 
of the collection generally does not raise privacy concerns because 
such use conforms to established social norms.261 These can include 
sharing an address with a carrier who will deliver a purchase, 
providing a credit card number to a bank for payment processing, 
internal operations, fraud prevention or first-party marketing. 262 
Because these uses are obvious and/or widely accepted and often do 
not involve choice, they may need only a brief or even no mention 
in the consumer notice. On the other hand, heightened attention to 
                                                
 259  See Florian Schaub, Rebecca Balebako, Adam L. Durity, Lorrie Faith 
Cranor, Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS): A Design Space 
for Effective Privacy Notices, (July 22–24, 2015), Ottawa, Canada (Unpublished 
and on file with SOUPS). 
 260 See National Cyber Security Alliance, Results of Consumer Data Privacy 
Survey Reveal Critical Need for All Digital Citizens to Participate in Data 
Privacy Day (Jan. 28, 2015), https://staysafeonline.org/about-us/news/results-of-
consumer-data-privacy-survey-reveal-critical-need-for-all-digital-citizens-to-
participate-in-data-privacy-day. 
 261 See generally Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context (Stanford Law Books 
2010); see also Kirsten Martin, Privacy Notices as Tabula Rasa: An Empirical 
Investigation into how Complying with a Privacy Notice is Related to Meeting 
Privacy Expectations Online, 34 J. OF PUB. POL’Y AND MKTG. 2, 210–27 (2015). 
 262 See Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, Federal Trade 
Commission (Mar. 2012), www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/ 
federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-
recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
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transparency is needed for information processing which is not 
reasonable in light of the context and violates consumer 
expectations.263 Potential contextual issues can be assessed as part of 
privacy-by-design or during a separate review such as a privacy 
impact assessment. 
E.  Technology should promote transparency by supporting the 
availability and utility of notice. 
While initial efforts at technological solutions have enjoyed 
limited success, technology may still play a significant role in 
fostering better transparency. Just as developments in technology 
and data processing have enabled powerful new offerings in 
products and services, such advances arguably should also enable 
more effective transparency that empowers individuals. 
One example of such work is the Usable Privacy Policy Project 
at Carnegie Mellon University. 264  The project responds to the 
limitations of natural language, privacy notices, and other obstacles 
by addressing the problem using machine implementable standards, 
the project builds on recent advances in natural language processing, 
privacy preference modeling, crowdsourcing, formal methods, and 
privacy interfaces. 265  The goal of the project is to develop a 
technological approach that would (1) semi-automatically extract 
key privacy policy elements from natural language notices posted 
on websites and (2) present these elements to users in a format that 
is easy to read and understand.266 For users, the project holds out the 
possibility of access to notices that would inform privacy decision-
making. For website operators, it promises a way to overcome the 
limitations of existing natural language notices without imposing 
new requirements. 
In addition to machine-readable notices, technology can also 
provide alternatives to traditional text notices. These can include 
                                                
 263 For example, the Obama Administration’s 2015 discussion draft of its 2015 
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act calls for a risk analysis and specifies notice 
requirements for data practices that are not reasonable in light of context. 
 264  See generally The Usable Privacy Policy Project, 
http://www.usableprivacy.org/learn_more (last visited Apr. 5, 2016). 
 265 Id. 
 266 Id. 
MAY 2016] From Privacy Notices to Effective Transparency 575 
images, icons, LEDs, or even auditory notices in the form of sounds 
or spoken word.267 The mode by which a notice is delivered is best 
selected to attract the individual’s attention given the context. 
Further, independent of how disclosures are delivered, notice design 
is most effective when developed as part of the overall system 
design and subjected to consumer testing prior to rollout. 
F.  Public education should work at the core of efforts to promote 
transparency. 
In addition to the issues discussed above, transparency requires 
the public be broadly informed about data collection and use – not 
only on an application-by-application basis, but also as a foundation 
for navigating the data ecosystem at large. This public awareness 
fosters greater understanding about data uses, their benefits to the 
individual and to society, and the risks that they raise. It also 
enhances understanding of when individual choice is available and 
when it is not, and the rationale behind the distinction. It provides 
clear guidance about an individual’s rights in her data, how she can 
exercise her rights, and where she can go to correct mistakes or 
obtain recourse when a company misuses data or fails to meet its 
obligations as articulated in law or the policies in its notice. Because 
privacy notices cannot both educate individuals about these issues 
and be timely, succinct, and clear; public education must be a 
separate and ongoing initiative. For example, the success of the 
nutrition label is due in part because the label was accompanied by 
an extensive, distinct consumer education effort. 268  This effort 
continues in the form of ongoing media coverage of nutrition as an 
element of health. As the experience with the nutrition label 
demonstrated, public education is not a one-time event and it is a 
responsibility that should be shared by the public and private 
sectors.269 
                                                
 267 Michael S. Wogalter et al., supra note 247. 
 268  See FRONT-OF-PACKAGE NUTRITION RATING SYSTEMS AND SYMBOLS: 
PROMOTING HEALTHIER CHOICES, (Ellen A. Wartella et al. eds. 2011); Archon 
Fung, Mary Graham, & David Weil, Full Disclosure, The Perils and Promise of 
Transparency 96 (2007). 
 269 The FTC has engaged in public education around emerging privacy risks, 
complying with FTC regulations and best practices. While some of the most 
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To make notice work as a vehicle for transparency, education 
must not only become the norm but should also be made more 
visible and easily accessible to the public. Brief, one-time attempts 
at public education prompted by some event or the release of some 
product or application will not be sufficient. Data collection that is 
ubiquitous, invisible, and integrated into infrastructures, requires 
that the public be apprised of how the ecosystem works and how it 
is evolving, particularly when these forms of data use are new, 
unexpected, and possibly violate current contextual norms. But 
while public education is critical, it does not obviate the need for the 
comprehensive notice and the consumer-focused notice we 
described earlier. Nor does it relieve companies of the responsibility 
to engage in responsible, ethical data practices. Rather, education is 
an essential complement to notice as it enables the public to make 
rational choices about data use, when available, based on a full 
understanding of a particular data ecosystem. Moreover, if 
individuals are educated, abbreviated notices or notification icons 
are more likely to effectively provide them with needed information. 
270 
                                                
notable instances of public education have been in the area of identity theft, which 
were targeted at consumers, many are focused on the business community. See 
Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Privacy Challenges and Opportunities: The Role of the 
Federal Trade Commission, 33 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 4, 4–9 (2014). 
 270 The use of sensors and beacons in retail environments provides a useful 
example. Here, the retailer contracts with a third party analytics firm to track 
customer behavior using their mobile devices. Transparency in this environment 
poses a challenge because a third party tracks the mobile devices, consumers may 
not be aware of the tracking, and it is difficult to provide useful in-store notice. 
Transparency would be improved if the retailer developed an icon to provide 
notice when tracking was occurring, the stores agreed to display the icon, and 
consumers were educated about the benefits and risks of these technologies, the 
icon, and their available choices, if they had any, to limit the tracking if they 
objected. While such an approach would not eliminate the need for the vendor to 
provide the tracking service and the retailer to provide traditional notice, it would 
make the tracking transparent. See About Smart Places, FUTURE OF PRIVACY 
FORUM, http://www.futureofprivacy.org/issues/smart-places/. 
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G.  Better transparency will depend on regulatory guidance 1and 
business buy-in. 
Proposals for providing consumers with an alternative notice 
that provides selected information absent a safe harbor have in the 
past raised concerns about opening companies to liability for failing 
to provide comprehensive descriptions of their data practices. 
Requiring both an abbreviated and a comprehensive notice would 
eliminate such liability concerns. However, this approach may call 
for legislation or regulation to provide organizations with clarity and 
assurances about their legal responsibilities and to reduce industry 
concerns about risk of exposure to regulatory action. While this 
occurred for the GLB model notice, developing guidance that is 
sufficiently specific yet applies across industries to a wide variety of 
business models and information practices is challenging. However, 
if regulators are unable or unwilling to offer a safe harbor for 
adopting a consumer notice that fulfills certain conditions provided, 
or to provide other motivation for business to act, the business 
community will likely resist this proposal. For example, Smith 
found that given the ambiguous external environment, executives 
rarely take active steps to develop new privacy practices absent 
some external event that forces them to act. 271  Recent events 
continue to provide support for his findings. The FTC content 
analysis of websites and its 2009 report on online behavioral 
advertising resulted in adoption of online privacy notices and the 
development of the AdChoices icon without new legislation. 272 
Regulators could advance transparency for consumers, for example, 
by conducting web surveys to assess whether firms are complying 
with existing regulations related to notice visibility and usability. 
Further, where appropriate, the FTC should decline to endorse any 
                                                
 271 See H. Jeff Smith, Privacy Policies and Practices: Inside the Organizational 
Maze, 36 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 104, 105–22 (1993). 
 272 Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/ 
federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-
recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf. In the Preliminary Staff Report, the 
FTC recognized the increase in privacy notices after the initial web sweeps; 
however, it also stated that a large number of the notices analyzed in the study 
were incomplete in terms of the basic elements of fair information practices. Id. 
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solution resulting from either an industry-developed self-regulatory 
program or a government-led multi-stakeholder process that has not 
been subjected to rigorous consumer testing to demonstrate its 
effectiveness. Absent pressure from government, business 
community leadership, and collaboration with consumer and 
privacy advocates, notices will fail to provide individuals with the 
usable information they need about data practices. 
Transparency should not pose a threat to organizations, and in 
fact, for responsible companies, transparency will enhance their 
relationship with consumers and customers. One study found that 
when privacy information is made more salient, some consumers are 
willing to pay a premium to purchase from privacy protective 
websites. What is particularly interesting about this study is that the 
participants in the experiment used their own credit cards to make 
actual purchases rather than just stating their intentions. The authors 
hypothesize that where there is transparency and privacy 
protections, privacy may serve as a selling point. 273  Where 
companies provide value in exchange for the use of their data, 
transparency enables consumers to evaluate the risk-benefit tradeoff 
for disclosure.274  Therefore, transparency does not pose a threat; 
rather, it promotes consumer trust and the innovative, responsible 
use of data. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Notices currently serve many purposes, including to provide a 
basis for individual choice; serve as the basis for regulation, promote 
public awareness of data practices, and enable oversight by privacy 
experts and advocates of issues related to the collection, processing, 
and protection of information about individuals. The process of 
creating notices also provides an opportunity for organizations to 
review and understand their data collection practices and make 
                                                
 273  See Janice Y. Tsai et al., The Effect of Online Privacy Information on 
Purchasing Behavior: An Experimental Study, 22 INF. SYS. RES. 254, 254–68 
(2011). 
 274  See Naveen F. Awad & M.S. Krishan, The Personalization Privacy 
Paradox: An Empirical Evaluation of Information Transparency and the 
Willingness to be Profiled Online for Personalization, 30 MIS QUARTERLY 13, 
13–28 (2006). 
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responsible decisions about internal data flows and external data 
uses. This Article discussed the shortcomings of traditional notices 
as a tool for promoting individual choice. It described the results of 
efforts to improve them through the use of layered or short notices 
and reviewed attempts to develop technological alternatives to 
traditional notice. Finally, it identified the challenges that new 
technologies such as big data, mobile environments, and the Internet 
of Things pose to notice. 
This Article further argues that the way data is collected, used, 
processed, and stored in the emerging data eco-system requires not 
simply improved notices, but a multi-pronged approach to 
informing the individual about data and privacy practices that 
promotes an overall environment of transparency. As this Article 
notes in the opening sections, transparency is a condition of 
disclosure and awareness created by organizations that involves the 
use of an array of methods, notice among them. Whether 
transparency is achieved depends on the extent to which information 
is disclosed—its timeliness, its clarity, and its accuracy. The authors 
conclude that while notice is central to transparency, transparency 
involves far more than notice; they agree that notices as currently 
implemented must be fixed, however, even if improved, notices will 
not be sufficient to achieve transparency the evolving data 
ecosystem requires more. 
Finally, this Article identifies the shortcomings of the current 
privacy regime as well as new challenges the twenty-first century 
data ecosystem poses for transparency. Further, while transparency 
is a necessary condition for fair data use, it alone is not sufficient, 
since all of the fair information principles contribute to fairness. 
While moving from notice to transparency poses its own challenges 
to both regulators and business, a combination of improved notices, 
attention to contextual norms, integration of the design of notices 
into the system development process as part of privacy-by-design, 
public education, and new technological solutions hold promise for 
addressing the current situation where there is agreement across a 
range of stakeholders that current privacy notices are simply not 
working. 	  
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